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VIRTUAL CURRENCIES; BITCOIN & WHAT NOW AFTER 
LIBERTY RESERVE, SILK ROAD, AND MT. GOX? 
 
Lawrence Trautman* 
 
Cite as: Lawrence Trautman, Virtual Currencies Bitcoin & What Now 
After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 
(2014), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i4/article13.pdf. 
 
I.  OVERVIEW 
 
[1] During 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department evoked the first use of 
the 2001 Patriot Act
1
 to exclude virtual currency provider Liberty Reserve 
from the U.S. financial system.
2
  This article will discuss: the regulation of 
virtual currencies, cybercrimes and payment systems, darknets, Tor and 
the “deep web,” Bitcoin; Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox.  
Virtual currencies have quickly become a reality, gaining significant 
traction in a very short period of time, and are evolving rapidly.  Virtual 
                                                     
* Thanks to the following for their assistance in the research and preparation of this 
article: Timothy Bauman, Edward W. Felten, Urs Gasser, Reuben Grinberg, Alvin 
Harrell, Tomas Olov Larsson, Vili Lehdonvirta, Tyler Moore, John Palfrey, Nicholas 
Plassaras, Ariel Rabkin, Mina Rady, Ulrike Schultz, Robin Teigland, John Trautman, 
François Velde, Ruoke Yang, Zeynep Yetis and Jonathan Zittrain.  All errors and 
omissions are my own. 
 
1
 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 
224(b), 115 Stat. 272, 295; see also Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the 
USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607 (2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=317501. 
 
2
 Press Release, Department of the Treasury, Treasury Identifies Virtual Currency 
Provider Liberty Reserve as a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering 
Concern under USA Patriot Act Section 311 (May 28, 2013), available at  
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl1956.aspx; see also Press 
Release, Department of Justice, Co-founder of Liberty Reserve Pleads Guilty to Money 
Laundering in Manhattan Federal Court, (Oct. 31, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/October/13-crm-1163.html. 
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currencies present particularly difficult law enforcement challenges 
because of their ability to transcend national borders in the fraction of a 
second, unique jurisdictional issues and anonymity due to encryption.  
Due primarily to their anonymity, virtual currencies have been linked to 
numerous types of crimes, including facilitating marketplaces for: 
assassins, attacks on businesses, the exploitation of children (including 
pornography), corporate espionage, counterfeit currencies, drugs, fake IDs 
and passports, high yield investment schemes (Ponzi schemes and other 
financial frauds), sexual exploitation, stolen credit cards and credit card 
numbers, and weapons.   
 
[2] Innovation in the pace of developing new currencies and 
technologies continues to create ongoing challenges for responsible users 
of technology and regulators alike.  While technological advances create 
great opportunities to improve the health, living conditions, and general 
wellbeing of mankind; new technologies also create great challenges for 
nation states.  Reminiscent of Lawrence Lessig’s comment that “code is 
law,”3  James Grimmelman observes, “[u]nlike the rule of law, the rule of 
software is simple and brutal: whoever controls the software makes the 
rules.  And if power corrupts, then automatic power corrupts 
automatically.”4 
 
A.  Structure of This Paper 
 
[3] This paper is organized as follows.  In Section II, a background 
describing virtual currencies, cybercrimes and payment systems is 
presented.  Section III depicts the regulation of Internet payments.  Section 
IV discusses and explores the mechanism, promise, ecosystem, and 
vulnerabilities of Bitcoin.  In Section V, Liberty Reserve is discussed, with 
                                                     
3
 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE (Basic Books 2d ed. 2006), available at 
http://codev2.cc/download+remix/Lessig-Codev2.pdf (discussing how code is 
cyberspace's law).  
 
4
 James Grimmelmann, Anarchy, Status Updates, and Utopia, 34 PACE L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358627. 
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the implications from Silk Road presented in Section VI.  In Section VII, 
the demise of Mt. Gox is described.  Section VIII depicts the collateral 
impact on Bitcoin from the failures of Liberty Reserve, Silk Road and Mt. 
Gox, and posits scenarios for Bitcoin’s likely future.  Implications for 
further research are then presented. 
 
II.  VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, CYBERCRIMES & PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
What is a Virtual Currency? 
 
[4] The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) observes that 
“[t]here are no legal definitions for a virtual economy or currency.”5  
However, “[a] virtual currency is, generally, a digital unit of exchange that 
is not backed by a government-issued legal tender.  Virtual currencies can 
be used entirely within a virtual economy, or can be used in lieu of a 
government-issued currency to purchase goods and services in the real 
economy.”6  
 
[5] FinCEN defines virtual currency as “those currencies that operate 
like a currency in some environments, but does not have legal tender 
status in any jurisdiction.”7  Mythili Raman defines virtual currency as “a 
                                                     
5
 See U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-516, VIRTUAL ECONOMIES AND 
CURRENCIES: ADDITIONAL IRS GUIDANCE COULD REDUCE TAX COMPLIANCE RISKS 3 
(2013). 
 
6
 Id. 
 
7
 Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 113th 
Cong. (Nov. 18, 2013) (statement of  Edward W. Lowery III, Special Agent in Charge, 
Criminal Investigative Division, U.S. Secret Service) (citing DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY 
FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, GUIDANCE FIN-2013-G0001, 
APPLICATION OF FINCENS’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, 
OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (Mar. 18, 2013)). 
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medium of exchange circulated over a network, typically the Internet, 
which is not backed by a government.”8  Moreover 
 
Early centralized models, where the currency is controlled 
by a single private entity, have expanded and now 
encompass a wide range of business concepts.  Some 
centralized virtual currencies take the form of digital 
precious metals, such as e-Gold and Pecunix, where users 
exchange digital currency units ostensibly backed by gold 
bullion or other precious metals.  Others exist within 
popular online games or virtual worlds, such as Farmville, 
Second Life, or World of Warcraft.  Still others are online 
payment systems such as WebMoney and Liberty Reserve, 
which are available generally outside of specific online 
communities and denominate users’ accounts in virtual 
currency rather than U.S. Dollars, Euros, or some other 
national currency.  Decentralized systems such as Bitcoin, 
which have no centralized administrating authority and 
instead operate as peer-to-peer transaction networks, 
entered the scene relatively recently but are growing 
rapidly.  A network of sites and services, including 
exchangers who buy and sell virtual currencies in exchange 
for national currencies or other mediums of value, have 
developed around virtual currency systems, as well.
9
 
 
                                                     
8
 Press Release, Department of Justice, Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili 
Raman Testifies Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs (Nov. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2013/crm-speech-131118.html. 
 
9
 Id. 
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[6] The forerunner to today’s virtual currency may be found in a 1982 
paper by computer scientist David Chaum.
10
  In 1990, Mr. Chaum founded 
DigiCash which unfortunately failed during 1999.
11
  Aleksandra Bal notes 
that unlike electronic money, where the “traditional money format is 
preserved, as the stored funds are expressed in the same unit of account 
(for example US dollars or euros).  In virtual currency schemes, the unit of 
account is changed into a virtual one (for example, Linden Dollars or 
Bitcoins).”12  Indeed, the genesis of virtual currency appears to result from 
the massive popularity of online games.
13
  Boston University’s Mark 
                                                     
10
 See David Chaum, Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments, In ADVANCES IN 
CRYPTOLOGY: PROCEEDINGS OF CRYPTO 82 (1982), available at 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-1-4757-0602-4_18. 
 
11
 FM Interviews: David Chaum, FIRST MONDAY (July 1999), available at 
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/article/view/683/593. 
 
12
 Aleksandra Bal, Stateless Virtual Money in the Tax System, 53 EUROPEAN TAXATION 
351, 351 (July 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298537. 
 
13
 See generally David A. Bray & Benn Konsynski, Virtual Worlds: Multi-Disciplinary 
Research Opportunities, 38 THE DATA BASE FOR ADVANCES IN INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS, Nov. 2007, at 17, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016485 (discussing 
how virtual worlds offer significant opportunities for research in many fields of research); 
Hiroshi Yamaguchi, An Analysis of Virtual Currencies in Online Games (Sep. 1, 2004), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=544422 (analyzing the economic and monetary 
system of online games and discussing its implications in the real economy); Jun-Sok 
Huhh, An Economic Analysis on Online Game Service (Aug. 28, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1335120 (investigating economic problems of a firm providing 
online game services); Levent V. Orman, Virtual Money in Electronic Markets and 
Communities (Cornell University, Johnson School Research Paper Series No. 27-2010, 
June 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1621725 (asserting that virtual money 
can benefit money semantics and management); Matthew Elias, Bitcoin: Tempering the 
Digital Ring of Gyges or Implausible Pecuniary Privacy (Oct. 3, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1937769 (comparing different forms of digital currencies to 
Bitcoin); Sukwon Thomas Kim, Why Bitcoin?: Structure and Efficiency of Markets for 
Online Game Currency (Dec. 18, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2334000 
(analyzing markets for online game currencies); Sulin Ba & Dan Ke, Optimal Pricing 
and Permissions Strategy for Virtual Good Creators in Second Life (Sept. 15, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1271684 (discussing the impact of virtual worlds on 
"the way people cooperate, communicate, and conduct business"); Vili Lehdonvirta, 
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Williams observes that “Bitcoin has not been recognized by any of the 
G20 countries as meeting the definition of currency as it lacks price 
stability and does not provide a stable store of value.  As a result it is a 
speculative virtual commodity with no tangible value.”14   
 
A.  Illicit Use of Virtual Currencies 
 
[7] In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, Mythili Raman observes that virtual 
currencies present two primary law enforcement interests to the 
Department of Justice (DOJ),  
 
(1) deterring and prosecuting criminals using virtual 
currency systems to move or hide money that is used to 
facilitate, or is derived from, criminal or terrorist acts, i.e., 
money laundering; and (2) investigating and prosecuting 
those virtual currency services that themselves violate laws 
aimed at illegal money transmission and money 
laundering.
15
 
 
                                                                                                                       
Virtual Item Sales as a Revenue Model: Identifying Attributes that Drive Purchase 
Decisions, 9 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE RESEARCH 97 (2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351769 (analyzing the what drives virtual spending); Vili 
Lehdonvirta, Real-Money Trade of Virtual Assets: New Strategies for Virtual World 
Operators, in VIRTUAL WORLDS 113 (Mary Ipe ed., Icfai University Press 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351782 (exploring the implications of trading 
virtual currencies for real money). 
 
14
 Hearing Regarding Virtual Currencies Before the New York State Department of 
Financial Services (Jan. 28-29, 2014) (statement of Mark T. Williams, Banking 
Specialist, Commodities and Risk Management Expert, Finance Department, Boston 
University), available at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/hearings/vc_01282014/williams.pdf.  See generally David 
Yermack, Is Bitcoin a Real Currency? (Dec. 1, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2361599 (discussing whether bitcoin is a real currency). 
 
15
 Raman, supra note 8, at 1. 
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[8] Digital currencies are believed by the U.S. Secret Service to be 
preferred by criminals because they offer 
 
1. The greatest degree of anonymity for both users and 
transactions. 
2. The ability to quickly and confidently move illicit 
proceeds from one country to another. 
3. Low volatility, which results in lower exchange 
risk, increasing the digital currency’s ability to be 
an efficient means to transmit and store wealth. 
4. Widespread adoption in the criminal underground.  
5. Trustworthiness.16 
 
Mythili Raman further explains  
 
Criminals are nearly always early adopters of new 
technologies and financial systems, and virtual currency is 
no exception.  As virtual currency has grown, it has 
attracted illicit users along with legitimate ones. . . .  
[S]ome criminals have exploited virtual currency systems 
because of the ability of those systems to conduct transfers 
quickly, securely, and often with a perceived higher level 
of anonymity than that afforded by traditional financial 
services.  The irreversibility of many virtual currency 
transactions additionally appeals to a variety of individuals 
seeking to engage in illicit activity, as does their ability to 
send funds cross-border.
17
 
 
                                                     
16
 Lowery, supra note 7.  But see E-mail from Ariel Rabkin, Postdoctoral Researcher, 
Computer Science Department, Princeton University (Feb. 23, 2014, 16:59 CST) (on file 
with author) (observing that Bitcoin prices have been famously volatile); and Danton 
Bryans, Note, Bitcoin and Money Laundering: Mining for an Effective Solution, 89 IND. 
L.J. 441, 441 (2014), available at http://ilj.law.indiana.edu/articles/19-Bryans.pdf. 
 
17
 Raman, supra note 8, at 2. 
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[9] Virtual currencies, due primarily to their anonymity, have been 
linked to numerous types of crimes, including facilitating marketplaces 
for: assassins, attacks on businesses, exploiting children (including 
pornography), corporate espionage, counterfeit currencies, drugs, fake IDs 
and passports, high yield investment schemes (Ponzi schemes and other 
financial frauds), sexual exploitation, stolen credit cards and credit card 
numbers, and weapons.
18
 
 
B.  Marketplace for Assassins 
 
[10] The diversity of illicit content available on underground message 
boards is truly astonishing.  Trend Micro, a member of the Digital 
Economy Task Force reports “privately maintained sites that offer specific 
types of goods and services.  Some are pages with prices and contact 
information for anonymous orders and others provide a full order and 
payment management system . . . include[ing] hired assassins.”19  A New 
York Times article regarding the website Silk Road and alleged exploits of 
                                                     
18
 See Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats and Promises of Virtual Currencies: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113
th
 Cong. 
(2013) (statement of Ernie Allen, President & CEO, The International Centre for Missing 
& Exploited Children); see also Christopher Bronk, Cody Monk & John Villasenor, The 
Dark Side of Cyber Finance, 54 Survival: Global Politics & Strategy 129 (2012); Raman, 
supra note 8; Fernando M. Pinguelo & Bradford W. Muller, Virtual Crimes, Real 
Damages: A Primer on Cybercrimes in the United States and Efforts to Combat 
Cybercriminals, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 116, 119 (2011); Malte Möser, Rainer Böhme & 
Dominic Breuker, An Inquiry into Money Laundering Tools in the Bitcoin Ecosystem, in 
Proceedings of the APWG eCrime Researchers Summit, San Francisco (ECRIME 2013), 
available at http://maltemoeser.de/paper/money-laundering.pdf; William Hett, Digital 
Currencies and the Financing of Terrorism, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4, ¶ 10 (2008), 
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v15i2/article4.pdf. 
 
19
 Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113
th
 Cong. 
(2013) (statement of Ernie Allen, President & CEO, The International Centre for Missing 
& Exploited Children). 
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Ross William Ulbricht, a/k/a “Dread Pirate Roberts,” points to a Baltimore 
criminal complaint depicting the solicitation of several killings.
20
 
 
C.  Attacks on Businesses 
 
[11] Examples of hacking attacks on businesses are recited daily by 
virtually every major news source.  Pinguelo and Muller observe that 
“[a]ttacks on businesses include such things as the theft of intellectual 
property, seizing bank accounts, generating and distributing malware, and 
other disruptive activity.”21  Cybersecurity experts from the law 
enforcement community observe that many of these illicit cyber services 
are routinely available and purchased with virtual currencies.
22
 
 
D.  Child Exploitation 
 
[12] In his November 18, 2013 testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ernie Allen, 
President & CEO of the International Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children (ICMEC), expresses concern about “the apparent migration of 
commercial child sexual exploitation, including sex abuse images, child 
exploitation and sex trafficking, along with other criminal enterprises to a 
new unregulated digital economy, made up of digital currencies; 
                                                     
20
 David Segal, Eagle Scout. Idealist. Drug Trafficker?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/business/eagle-scout-idealist-drug-trafficker.html. 
 
21
 Pinguelo & Muller, supra note 18, at 119; see also Lawrence J. Trautman, E-
Commerce and Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons from PayPal, 17 SMU 
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW (2014), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2314119; Lawrence J. Trautman, Jason Triche & James C. 
Wetherbe, Threats Escalate: Corporate Information Governance Under Fire, 8 JOURNAL 
OF STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 105 (2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171026; Lawrence J. Trautman & 
Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s Responsibility for Information Technology 
Governance, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L., 313 (2011). 
 
22
 Raman, supra note 8, at 2. 
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anonymous online payment systems; anonymous internet tools; and file 
hosting companies.”23  Examples of large scale providers of child 
pornography are numerous.  Accordingly, 
 
In August 2013 the Irish founder/owner/operator of 
Freedom Hosting, which the FBI called ‘the largest 
facilitator of child pornography on the planet,’ was 
arrested.  Freedom Hosting maintained servers for a 
number of Tor-based, so-called ‘deep web’ child 
pornography sites and others.  The best-known child 
pornography sites included Lolita City, the Love Zone and 
PedoEmpire, all of which accept Bitcoins for payment. 
 
To shut down Freedom Holdings, law enforcement 
exploited a ‘java script exploit,’ a vulnerability in the site, 
enabling law enforcement to penetrate Tor and expose the 
IP addresses of the users of Freedom Hosting.  
Interestingly, in 2011 the hacktivist group, Anonymous, 
hacked into Tor to shut down Lolita City.  However, Lolita 
City has reemerged with an estimated 15,000 members and 
1.5 million child pornography images.
24
 
 
                                                     
23
 See Allen, supra note 19; see generally Mark Latonero, Technology and Human 
Trafficking: The Rise of Mobile and the Diffusion of Technology-Facilitated Trafficking 
(Nov. 13, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2177556 (discussing the role of 
modern technologies in facilitating and combating human trafficking); Mark Latonero, 
Human Trafficking Online: The Role of Social Networking Sites and Online Classifieds 
(Sept. 1, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045851 (examining the "role of 
social networking cites and online classified ads in facilitating human trafficking"); 
Danah Boyd, Heather Casteel, Mitali Thakor & Rane Johnson, Human Trafficking and 
Technology: A Framework for Understanding the Role of Technology in the Commercial 
Exploitation of Children in the U.S., available at http://research.microsoft.com/en-
us/collaboration/focus/education/htframework-2011.pdf (discussing the role technology 
plays in human trafficking). 
 
24
 Allen, supra note 19. 
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[13] In another case known as Dreamboard, various measures were 
employed to conceal the sale of child exploitation images and videos over 
the Internet, including: the use of screen names or aliases rather than 
actual names, all links to pornography were encrypted requiring passwords 
only available to members, and all Internet access traffic was routed 
through proxy servicers and sent through a pathway involving multiple 
nodes designed to “disguise a user’s actual location and prevent law 
enforcement from tracing Internet activity.  Dreamboard members also 
encouraged the use of encryption programs on their computers, which 
password-protect computer files to prevent law enforcement from 
accessing them in the event of a court-authorized search.”25 
 
[14] In addition to those already cited, other child pornography sites 
mentioned by ICMEC as accepting payment in digital currencies include 
Hard Candy, Jailbait and others.
26
  During December 2013, Acting 
Assistant Attorney General Raman announced the creation of a task force 
to counter online child exploitation, observing that “[s]exual predators are 
using technology to exploit and harm children, and we need to consider 
whether technology-based solutions can help curb this abuse . . . we know 
that the help and support of the innovators in the tech community are 
critical.”27 
 
E.  Corporate Espionage 
 
[15] Corporate espionage is rampant.  Technology provides 
sophisticated tools to those who would seek to steal the intellectual 
                                                     
25
 Press Release, Department of Justice, Dreamboard Member Sentenced to 45 Years in 
Prison for Participating in International Criminal Network Organized to Sexually Exploit 
Children (Jan. 8, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/January/13-crm-
034.html. 
 
26
 See Allen, supra note 19. 
 
27
 Press Release, Department of Justice, U.S., U.K. Law Enforcement Launch Task Force 
to Counter Online Child Exploitation (Dec. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/December/13-crm-1299.html. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 4 
 
12 
 
property assets that represent future economic stability, jobs for our 
children, and the promise of a society that moves forward in peace.  
Assistant Director Richard McFeely states, “[t]he FBI will not stand by 
and watch the hemorrhage of U.S. intellectual property to foreign 
countries who seek to gain an unfair advantage for their military and their 
industries . . .  Since 2008, our economic espionage arrests have doubled; 
indictments have increased five-fold; and convictions have risen eight-
fold.”28  Testimony reveals that many of the illicit cyber services involved 
with corporate espionage are routinely available and purchased with 
virtual currencies.
29
 
 
F.  Drugs 
 
[16] Having started as an organized, illicit, cross-border activity, drug 
trafficking now constitutes a serious threat to nation states because of its 
close alliance with worldwide terrorist groups.
30
  Silk Road, described as 
the “Amazon for Drugs,” is perhaps the most significant example of a site 
reported to have been responsible for major sales, “[y]et, barely one month 
later the site is back up and is operating again.”31  Liberty Reserve, the 
                                                     
28
 Press Release, Department of Justice, Sinovel Corporation and Three Individuals 
Charged in Wisconsin with Theft of Amsc Trade Secrets (June 27, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/June/13-crm-730.html; see also Pinguelo & Muller, 
supra note 18 at 126; Joshua Nathan Aston, Narco-Terrorism – A Critical Study (Jan. 29, 
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221590. 
 
29
 See generally Raman, supra note 8 (noting the appeal of virtual currencies to 
criminals); Trautman, Triche & Wetherbe, supra note 21(examining cyber security 
threats). 
 
30
 See generally Aston, supra note 28 (observing that transnational organized crime is 
considered as one of the major threats to human security, impeding the political, social, 
economic, and cultural development of societies worldwide). 
 
31
 Allen, supra note 18.  But see Jose Pagliery, Drug Site Silk Road Wiped Out by Bitcoin 
Glitch, CNN MONEY (Feb. 14, 2014, 11:16 AM) 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/02/14/technology/security/silk-road-bitcoin/ (reporting Silk 
Road victim of hacking loss of $2.7 million). 
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other major digital currency service to receive focus in this paper, 
“allegedly laundered more than $6 billion in suspected proceeds of 
crimes.”32  The DOJ’s announcement of Vladimir Kats’ guilty plea reports 
that before operations were stopped during May 2013, “Liberty Reserve 
had more than one million users worldwide, including more than 200,000 
users in the United States who conducted approximately 55 million 
transactions through its system and allegedly laundered more than $6 
billion in suspected proceeds of crimes, including . . . narcotics 
trafficking.”33  Other arrests have been reported.  For example, “in 
February [2013] Australian police arrested a cocaine dealer operating on 
Silk Road and being paid in Bitcoins.  In May [2013] Israeli police broke 
up a drug distribution ring operating in Bitcoins.”34   
 
G.  Fake IDs and Passports 
 
[17] Just one of many cases involving the use of and sale of false 
identities and counterfeit certificates of title, the U.S. Department of 
Justice reported in October, 2013 that Romanian fugitive Nicolae Popescu 
and his criminal syndicate held non-existent high-value items such as 
boats, cars, and motorcycles    priced generally between $10,000 to 
$  ,000    and “produced and used high-quality fake passports . . . as 
identification by co-conspirators in the United States to open bank 
accounts.”35  In this and similar cases, the DOJ reported that “the illicit 
                                                     
32
 Press Release, Department of Justice, Co-Founder of Liberty Reserve Pleads Guilty to 
Money Laundering in Manhattan Federal Court (Oct. 31, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/October/13-crm-1163.html. 
 
33
 Id. 
 
34
 Allen, supra note 18; see Segal, supra note 20, ¶ 2 (citing $1.2 billion of transactions, 
many for cocaine, heroin and LSD). 
 
35
 Press Release, Department of Justice, Indictment Unsealed and “Wanted” Posters 
Issued for Fugitives Charged With Multimillion Dollar International Cyber Fraud 
Scheme (Oct. 24, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/October/13-
crm-1128.html. 
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proceeds were then withdrawn from the U.S. bank accounts and sent to the 
defendants in Europe by wire transfer and other methods [often virtual 
currencies].”36 
 
H.  High Yield Investment Schemes 
 
[18] Ponzi schemes and other forms of financial frauds seem to find 
virtual currencies attractive.  Observing that “cyber criminals were among 
the first illicit groups to take widespread advantage of virtual currency,” 
Acting Assistant Attorney General Raman stated that “high-yield 
investment schemes” are among the types of crimes conducted with the 
use of virtual currencies.
37
 
 
I.  Sexual Exploitation 
 
[19] Recent Congressional hearings produced testimony revealing that 
“[w]hile much of the evidence is still anecdotal, there is consensus that . . . 
sexual exploitation, sex trafficking and other criminal enterprises are 
increasingly moving to a new unregulated, unbanked digital economy.”38 
                                                     
36
 Id. 
 
37
 Raman, supra note 8. See generally Tyler Moore, Jie Han & Richard Clayton, The 
Postmodern Ponzi Scheme: Empirical Analysis of High-Yield Investment Programs, in 
FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY 41 (Angelos D. Keromytis, Ed., 2012), 
available at http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-642-32946-3 (describing an 
extensive online ecosystem that has developed in support of these HYIPs, including 
discussion websites, digital currencies, and third-party aggregator websites that track 
HYIP performance); Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: Today Techies, Tomorrow the World?, 
MILKEN INST. REV. 22, 24 (First Quarter 2012), available at 
http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/review/2012_1/22-31MR53.pdf (discussing 
the criminal use of Bitcoin). 
 
38
 Allen, supra note 18; see also Latonero, supra note 23. 
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J.  Stolen Credit Cards 
[20] Just one of the many examples of the sale of credit card or 
personally identifiable information (PII) involving hundreds of thousands 
of American’s accounts is found in the DOJ’s 15-count indictment of 
Vietnamese national, Hieu Minh Ngo, age 2 , “charging him with 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, substantive wire fraud, conspiracy to 
commit identity fraud, substantive identity fraud, aggravated identity theft, 
conspiracy to commit access device fraud, and substantive access device 
fraud.”39  The DOJ further states that “Ngo and his co-conspirators created 
one or more accounts with a digital currency service and used those 
accounts to receive funds for the stolen payment card data, ‘fullz’ and 
other PII that they sold.”40  
K.  Darknets, Tor & the “Deep Web” 
 
[21] Although not the specific cryptographic tool used to produce 
virtual currencies such as (potentially anonymous) Bitcoin, a number of 
“deep web” tools exist to ensure privacy and deserve brief mention here.  
These cryptographic tools may be used for both good and evil acts.  For 
example, many sites dealing in illegal drugs and other illicit goods and 
                                                     
39
 Press Release, Department of Justice, Vietnamese National Charged in Widespread 
International Scheme to Steal and Sell Hundreds of Thousands of U.S. Persons’ 
Personally Identifiable Information (Oct. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/October/13-crm-1116.html. 
 
40
 Id.; see also Press Release, Department of Justice, Romanian National Sentenced to 21 
Months in Prison for Role in Multimillion-Dollar Scheme to Remotely Hack into and 
Steal Payment Card Data from Hundreds of U.S. Merchants’ Computers (Jan. 7, 2013), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/January/13-crm-028.html; Press Release, 
Department of Justice, International Cybercriminal Extradited from Thailand to the 
United States (May 3, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/May/13-
crm-502.html; Trautman, Triche & Wetherbe, supra note 21 (providing a recent account 
of credit card fraud and corporate cybersecurity risk); Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, 
supra note 21.  
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services such as Silk Road and Black Market Reloaded rely on anonymous 
proxy network Tor “to prevent law enforcement from identifying the sites’ 
operator and users.”41  
 
[22] Anonymizing tools such as Tor have provided significant benefits 
to enable secure communications for: governments, law enforcement 
agencies, businesses; journalists as they work to communicate with 
dissidents and send confidential news, enabled oppressed peoples during 
the “Arab Spring” to overthrow oppressive regimes, and influenced 
governmental change recently in Egypt in large measure by enabling 
individuals and political activist groups to communicate privately with 
reduced fear of reprisals.
42
  Other groups such as “the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) recommend Tor as a mechanism for maintaining civil 
liberties online.  Corporations use Tor as a safe way to conduct 
competitive analysis, and to protect sensitive procurement patterns from 
eavesdroppers.”43 
 
[23] Tor in its present form is an outgrowth of “[T]he [O]nion 
[R]outing” (TOR) project, (as in  pealing back the layers of an onion), 
originally funded and nurtured by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory.
44
  
To mask a users identity disclosed by a senders or receivers’ header 
information (traffic analysis), the Tor system distributes a transaction 
                                                     
41
 Timothy Bauman, Commerce and Reputation in Online Illegal Drug Markets (Apr. 3, 
2013) (unpublished Senior Thesis, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International 
Affairs, Princeton University) available at 
http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01sq87bt70p. 
 
42
 See generally Mina Rady, Anonymity Networks: New Platforms for Conflict and 
Contention 22 (MIT Political Science Department, Research Paper No. 2013-5), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2241536 (discussing the various consequences of 
anonymity network). 
 
43
 Tor: Overview, TOR PROJECT, available at 
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited April 10, 2014). 
 
44
 Id. 
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“over several places on the Internet, so that no single point can link you to 
your destination.”45  Bauman observes that Tor 
 
Prevents traffic analysis by encrypting both the header and 
the content and sending them both through a series of proxy 
servers, known as nodes, each of which knows only the 
identities of the adjacent proxies in the chain.  Every node 
in the chain would have to be compromised for an attacker 
to discover both the originator and the recipient of a packet.  
This allows for a near-guarantee of anonymity as long as at 
least one node in the chain is trusted, and as long as there 
are enough other users of the Tor network that an 
individual’s traffic is hard to identify . . .  Tor relays exist 
all over the world, which helps them effectively anonymize 
traffic.  The two countries with the most relays are the 
United States, with about 800, followed by Germany with 
about  00.  More than 300 list their country code as “zz,” 
which does not correspond to a real country, thereby 
attempting to hide the country of that relay.
46
 
 
A graphic depiction of a Tor network is presented at Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
45
 The Solution: A Distributed, Anonymous Network, TOR PROJECT, available at 
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited April 10, 2014) 
[hereinafter The Solution]. 
 
46
 Bauman, supra note 41 at 12 (citing Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson & Paul 
Syverson, Tor: The Second-generation Onion Router, Naval Research Lab, Wash. D.C. 
(2004); see also Tor Metrics Portal: Network, TOR PROJECT, available at 
https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html (last viewed April 10, 2014)). 
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Overview of Tor Mechanism
47
 
 
 
[24] The Tor network directs message packets to take a random path 
through numerous difficult-to-identify interim relays rather than the most 
direct route, thereby covering a messenger’s “tracks so no observer at any 
single point can tell where the data came from or where it’s going.”48  Tor 
works by constructing a circuit of encrypted network relay connections to 
create a unique secured private pathway for information or transaction 
flow.  According to the Tor project 
 
The circuit is extended one hop at a time, and each relay 
along the way knows only which relay gave it data and 
                                                     
47
 Rady, supra note 42 at 6.  
 
48
 The Solution, supra note 45. 
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which relay it is giving data to.  No individual relay ever 
knows the complete path that a data packet has taken.  The 
client negotiates a separate set of encryption keys for each 
hop along the circuit to ensure that each hop can’t trace 
these connections as they pass through. 
 
Once a circuit has been established, many kinds of data can 
be exchanged and several different sorts of software 
applications can be deployed over the Tor network.  
Because each relay sees no more than one hop in the 
circuit, neither an eavesdropper nor a compromised relay 
can use traffic analysis to link the connection’s source and 
destination.  Tor only works for TCP [Transmission 
Control Protocol] streams and can be used by an 
application with SOCKS [Socket Secure] support.
49
   
 
[25] Tor hidden services offers an environment where users may instant 
message or publish materials and keep their locations anonymous by 
“[u]sing Tor ‘rendezvous points,’ other Tor users can connect to these 
hidden services, each without knowing the other’s network identity . . . .  
Nobody [is] able to determine who [is] offering the site, and nobody who 
offered the site would know who [is] posting to it.”50  
 
[26] It should come as no surprise that criminals are attracted to the 
ability to communicate and conduct financial transactions on an 
anonymous basis.  These “[o]nline black markets capitalize on Tor’s 
                                                     
49
 Id. 
 
50
 The Tor Project, Hidden Services, available at 
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en; see also Nassim Nazemi, Note and 
Comment: DMCA § 512 Safe Harbor for Anonymity Networks Amid a Cyber-Democratic 
Storm: Lessons from the 2009 Iranian Uprising, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 855, 868-70 (2012).  
But see Nicholas Hopper, Short Paper: Challenges in Protecting Tor Hidden Services 
From Botnet Abuse, available at http://ifca.ai/fc14/papers/fc14_submission_152.pdf 
(describing the potential for a decrease in the privacy of hidden service users). 
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anonymizing features to offer a wide selection of illicit goods and services 
. . . .”51   
III.  REGULATION OF INTERNET PAYMENTS 
 
[27] With the volume of online transactions achieving tremendous 
growth during the past two decades, the ability to securely accept online 
payments has become profoundly important for global business.
52
  
Unfortunately, as Fred Chang observes, “[o]ur trust in cyberspace has 
been taken from us by hackers, cybercriminals and sophisticated cyber 
attackers who intend to do us harm . . . .  Attacks on both the public sector 
and the private sector are rampant.  Denial of service, identity theft, and 
cyber extortion are now all too common.”53  Therefore,  “[c]reating and 
protecting trust . . . becomes a crucial issue in the regulation of payment 
services . . . .  It is generally accepted that adequate regulation is a key pre-
cursor to consumer acceptance of new payment methods, including mobile 
banking and payments.”54  Regulation should reflect the ethical 
                                                     
51
 Raman, supra note 8, at 2.  But see Andrew Grossman, Federal Agents Pierce Tor 
Web-Anonymity Tool, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303949704579461641349857358 
(contending that Tor’s anonymity shield isn’t impenetrable). 
 
52
 See, e.g., Paul Benjamin Lowry, Taylor Michael Wells, Greg Moody, Sean Humphreys 
& Degan Kettles, Online Payment Gateways Used to Facilitate E-Commerce 
Transactions and Improve Risk Management, 17 Comm. of the Ass’n for Info. Sys. 
(CAIS) 1, 3 (2006) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=879797; see also Brian Mantel & 
Timothy McHugh, Competition and Innovation in the Consumer e-Payments Market? 
Considering the Demand, Supply, and Public Policy Issues 33 (Emerging Payments 
Occasional Working Paper Series, Paper No. EPS-2001-4, 2001) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=298388. 
 
53
 Hearing on Cyber R&D Challenges and Solutions Before the Subcomm. on Tech., 
Subcomm. on Research, & H. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., 113th Cong. (2013) 
(statement of Frederick R. Chang, President & COO, 21CT, Inc.). 
 
54
 Rhys Bollen, The Legal Status of Online Currencies: Are Bitcoins the Future?, J. 
BANKING & FIN. L. & PRAC. 1, 38 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2285247. 
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implications of payment systems and virtual currencies such as Bitcoin.  
For example, Angel and McCabe observe that:  
 
Proponents of the use of the bitcoin system view it as a 
workaround for their lack of trust in the existing payment 
infrastructure, dependent as it is on a fallible central bank 
or other payment intermediary . . . .  The continuing 
evolution in the technology of payments raises interesting 
ethical questions for businesses as well as public policy 
considerations . . . .  Situations in which the bargaining 
power of one of the parties is limited raise questions about 
the fairness of the result . . . .  A new payment system such 
as bitcoin, like any tool, is neither good nor evil on its own, 
but it is the ethical or unethical use of the payment system 
that matters.
55
 
 
[28] Lowry, Wells, Moody, Humphreys and Kettles observe that the 
academic literature about electronic internet payment systems proposes 
models,
56
 protocols,
57
and architectures
58
 to facilitate online payments.  
                                                     
55
 JAMES J. ANGEL & DOUGLAS MCCABE, THE ETHICS OF PAYMENTS: PAPER, PLASTIC, OR 
BITCOIN? 14-16 (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2379233. 
 
56
 See Lowry et al., supra note 52, at 5 (citing X. Hou & C. H. Tan, A New Electronic 
Cash Model 374-79, Paper presented at the Int’l Conference on Info. Tech.: Coding and 
Computing, Las Vegas, NV, April 4-6, 2005; S. F. Mjølsnes & C. Rong, On-line e-Wallet 
System with Decentralized Credentials Keepers, 8 MOBILE NETWORKS AND 
APPLICATIONS 87 (2003) available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=603909). 
 
57
 Id. (citing A.R. Dani, P.R. Krishna & V. Subramanian, An Electronic Payment System 
Architecture for Composite Payment Transactions, Paper presented at the International 
Conference on e-Technology, e-Commerce, and e-Service, Hong Kong, China, March 
29-April 1 2005 at 552-555; M. Kinateder & K. Rothermel, Bringing Confidence to the 
Web-Combining the Power of SET and Reputation Systems, Paper presented at the First 
IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, Las Vegas, NV, Jan. 5-8, 
2004 at 545-550; B. Meng & Q. Xiong, SOCPT: A Secure Online Card Payment 
Protocol, Payment presented at the 8
th
 International Conference on Computer Supported 
Cooperative Work in Design, Xiamen, China, May 26-28, 2004 at 679-684; V. 
Varadharajan & Y. Mu, On the Design of secure Electronic Payment Schemes for 
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Other studies provide mathematical proofs of specific protocols.
59
  These 
models, protocols and architectures focus on providing security, 
accountability, atomicity, anonymity, non-repudiation, and fairness to 
transactions.
60
  For online payment systems, the most vital of these may be 
security,
61
 identified identification, confidentiality, authentication, data 
integrity, non-repudiation, and customer solvency as key levels of security 
surrounding payment alternatives.
62
  
                                                                                                                       
Internet, Paper presented at the 12
th
 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 
San Diego, CA, Dec. 9-13, 1996 at 78-87). 
 
58
 Id. (citing H. Knospe & S. Schwiderski-Grosche, Future Mobile Networks: Ad-hoc 
Access Based on Online Payment with Smartcards, Paper presented at the 13
th
 IEEE 
International Symposium on Personal, Indoor, and Mobile radio Communications, 
Lisbon, Portugal, Sept. 15-18, 2002 at 197-200; A. Liu, V.Y. Shen & J.K. Muppala, 
Security Issues on Server-Side Credit-Based Electronic Payment Systems, Paper 
presented at the 3
rd
 International Symposium on Electronic Commerce, Research 
Triangle Park, NC, Oct. 18-19 at 47-57; J. ZHANG ET AL., MIGRATION TO WEB SERVICES 
ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE    A CASE STUDY 1624 (2004)). 
 
59
 Id. (citing M. Backes & M. Dürmuth, A Cryptographically Dound Dolev-Yao Style 
Security Proof of an Electronic Payment System, Paper presented to the 18
th
 IEEE 
Computer Security Foundations Workshop, June 20-22 Axin-en-Provence, France at 78; 
G. Bella, F. Massicci & L.C. Paulson, The Verification of an Industrial Payment 
Protocol: The SET Purchase Phase, Paper presented at the 9
th
 ACM Conference on 
Computer and Communications Security, Washington, DC, Nov. 18-22 at 12 available at 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~lp15/papers/Bella/purchase.pdf). 
 
60
 Id. (citing Meng & Xiong, supra note 57). 
 
61
 Lowry et al., supra note 52, at 5 (citing I. Mavridis, G. Pangalos, T. Koukouinos & S. 
Muftic, A Secure Payment System for Electronic Commerce, Paper presented at the 10
th
 
International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications, Florence, Italy, 
Sept. 1-3, 1999 at 832; J. Sahut & M. Galuszewska, Electronic Payment Market: A Non-
optimal Equilibrium, Paper presented at the 2004 International Symposium on 
Applications and the Internet Workshops, Tokyo, Jan. 26-30, 2004 at 3). 
 
62
 Id. at 5-6 (quoting J. Sahut & M. Galuszewska, Electronic Payment Market: A Non-
optimal Equilibrium, Paper presented at the 2004 International Symposium on 
Applications and the Internet Workshops, Tokyo, Jan. 26-30, 2004 at 3). 
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A.  Regulatory Fabric 
 
[29] The schematic for regulation of money transmission in the United 
States involves both State and Federal laws.  Primarily, an anti-money 
laundering statute, the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) regulates transmission 
at the Federal level.
63
   
 
B.  U.S. State Money Transmission Laws 
 
[30] By contrast with federal statutes, “State money transmitter laws 
vary by jurisdiction and focus on consumer protection concerns.”64  
Accordingly, state money transmitter laws are essentially ‘safety and 
soundness’ statutes designed to ensure that consumer funds are protected 
from loss.
65
  These state “statutes historically regulated money transfer 
businesses like Western Union with an eye toward preventing consumer 
harm.  The plain language of such statutes, however, purports to broadly 
regulate the receipt of money or monetary value for the purpose of 
transmitting it to another place or location by any means.”66  It appears 
                                                     
63
 Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA L.REV. 77, 86 (2013), 
(citing 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2011); FinCEN’s Mandate from Congress, FINANCIAL CRIMES 
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/bsa/ (last visited May 18, 
2014); Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin Harrell, Bitcoin vs. Regulated Payment Systems: 
What Gives?, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. (2014).  
 
64
 Id. at 85 (citing UNIF. MONEY SERV. ACT, prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. 163-64 (2004), 
available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/money%20services/umsa_final04.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2013) (noting that state laws are ‘extremely varied’); see, e.g., CAL. FIN. 
CODE § 2002 (Deering 2014) (the purpose is to protect the interests of consumers); VA 
CODE ANN. § 6.2-1902(B) (2010) (the statute shall be construed for the purpose of 
protecting, against financial loss, citizens of Virginia who purchase money orders or 
control of their funds or credit into the custody of another person for transmission). 
 
65
 See UNIF. MONEY SERV. ACT, supra note 64. 
 
66
 Kevin V. Tu, supra note 63, at 77. 
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that both enforcement and clear guidance by some states has been 
inconsistent, and “in the face of such uncertainty, Amazon, Google, and 
PayPal have all become licensed money transmitters under state law.  
Even Facebook has become licensed in advance of launching a payments 
product in order to mitigate the risk of sanctions as the development of 
their payments product continues to evolve.”67  
 
[31] A license is required in most states before a money transmitter may 
conduct business.
68
 Therefore, any entity operating as a money transmitter 
that fails to obtain the necessary state licensing or to register with FinCEN 
may become subject to criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §1960.
69
 
 
Many virtual currency systems, exchangers, and related 
services operate as money transmitters, which are part of a 
larger class of institutions called money services 
businesses.  Money transmitters are required under 31 
U.S.C. §5330 to register with the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN). . . .  Additionally, the 
general money laundering and spending statutes, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1956 and 1957, cover financial transactions involving 
virtual currencies.  Finally, where virtual currencies are 
used in furtherance of underlying criminal activity, the 
Department [of Justice] can rely on traditional criminal 
statutes proscribing that activity, such as narcotics, 
cybercrime, child exploitation, and firearms laws.
70
  
 
                                                     
67
 Id. at 78; see also Trautman, supra note 21, at 22. 
 
68
 Raman, supra note 8. 
 
69
 Id. 
 
70
 Id. 
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[32] During the early part of 2014, FinCEN published two 
administrative rulings regarding virtual currencies, providing much needed 
guidance.  Accordingly, 
 
The first ruling states that, to the extent a user creates or 
“mines” a convertible virtual currency solely for a user’s 
own purposes, the user is not a money transmitter under the 
BSA.  The second states that a company purchasing and 
selling convertible virtual currency as an investment 
exclusively for the company’s benefit is not a money 
transmitter.
71
 
 
[33] In addition to money transmission statutes, states have also 
adopted cybercrime statutes.  Because Virginia is the home state to many 
Internet service providers including America OnLine, “it has been dubbed 
‘the epicenter of Internet traffic,’ and has adopted some of the toughest 
cybercrime legislation in the country.”72  Pinguelo and Muller provide a 
forty-nine state survey of cyberlaw legislation as of 2013.
73
 
 
[34] The New York State Department of Financial Services announced 
in August 2013 that it has launched a fact-finding effort regarding 
guidelines for regulating virtual currencies with a view toward exploring 
the potential NYDFS issuance of a ‘BitLicence’.74  In his opening 
statement for Hearings on the Regulation of Virtual Currency, New York 
                                                     
71
 Press Release, FinCEN, FinCEN Publishes Two Rulings on Virtual Currency Miners 
and Investors (Jan. 30, 2014), available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/nr/pdf/20140130.pdf. 
 
72
 Pinguelo & Muller, supra note 18, at 149. 
 
73
 See id. at 150-55. 
 
74
 See Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Serv., NYDFS Outlines Additional Details on 
Witnesses and Panels for Virtual Currency Hearing on January 28 and 29 in New York 
City (Jan. 23, 2014), available at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/panels_witnesses_virtual_currency_hearing.pdf. 
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Superintendent of Financial Services, Benjamin M. Lawsky, stated that 
“[i]t’s hard to say precisely what the future holds for virtual currency and 
its associated technology.  Currently, there is not widespread adoption of 
virtual currencies among the general public.  And some doubt whether 
there will ever be.”75  Moreover, 
 
[S]erious people – in the technological and investment 
community – are taking virtual currencies seriously.  They 
are putting significant amounts of time, attention, and 
capital behind them.  We, as a regulator, cannot turn a blind 
eye to something like that.  We don’t really have a choice.  
Moreover, the Department of Financial Services – like 
many other state financial regulators – has a specific legal 
responsibility to license and regulate money transmission.  
And to the extent that some virtual currency service 
providers are engaged in money transmission, we do have 
an important role in writing and enforcing the rules of the 
game for financial firms . . . .  [V]irtual currency could 
ultimately have a number of benefits for our financial 
system.  It could force the traditional payments community 
to "up its game" in terms of the speed, affordability, and 
reliability of financial transactions . . . .  Fashioning 
appropriate guardrails for virtual currencies presents 
challenging questions for regulators.  Virtual currency is 
not easily categorized within the divisions we traditionally 
think about when it comes to the financial system (such as 
banks, insurers, or money transmitters).  It’s neither fish 
nor fowl.
76
 
 
                                                     
75
 Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Fin. Serv., N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Serv., Opening 
Statement to Hearings on the Regulation of Virtual Currency (Jan. 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/hearings/vc_01282014/lawsky_vchearing.pdf. 
 
76
 Id. 
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Indeed, Superintendent Lawsky suggests that the term “money 
transmission” connotes an image of “firms that were formed more than 
1 0 years ago when our country was still exploring the western frontier.”77  
The challenge to regulators everywhere is to determine “what type of 
licensing, examination, and collateral re uirements for the virtual currency 
industry will provide appropriate guardrails to protect consumers and our 
national security     without stifling beneficial innovation.”78  Moreover, 
 
Safety and soundness requirements help build greater 
confidence among customers that the funds that they 
entrust to virtual currency companies won’t get caught in a 
virtual black hole.  Indeed, some consumers have expressed 
concerns about how quickly their virtual currency 
transactions are processed.  There have also been public 
reports of virtual currency lost – perhaps irretrievably – 
through hacking and other cyber security vulnerabilities.  
Addressing those issues through enhanced safety and 
soundness requirements would be important to building 
greater confidence in this technology among the general 
public and promoting wider adoption.
79
 
 
C.  Implications for Tax Revenues 
 
[35] Virtual transactions, virtual economies and transactions within 
these virtual economies are often very different.
80
  Cryptocurrencies 
                                                     
77
 Id. 
 
78
 Id. 
 
79
 Id.; accord Cameron Winklevoss & Tyler Winklevoss, Written Testimony of Cameron 
and Tyler Winklevoss to the New York State Department of Financial Services NYDFS 
Virtual Currency Hearing (Jan. 28 2014), available at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/hearing/vchearing/winklevoss.pdf. 
 
80
 See Leandra Lederman,  'Stranger than Fiction': Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1620, 1670-72 (2007); Theodore P. Seto, When is a Game Only a Game?: The 
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present difficult challenges to taxing authorities worldwide.
81
  A 
discussion of global tax issues and implications is beyond the scope of this 
paper; however, with a focus on the United States, general comments are 
provided to outline some of the major issues and suggest topics for further 
research.  Aleksandra Bal observes that “the  uestion as to whether or not 
virtual currency may constitute taxable income is likely to vary from 
country to country.”82  Moreover, tax administrators worldwide face the 
challenge of “how to approach a system that is outside the traditional 
streams of commerce and finance and for users to understand the tax 
conse uences of their transactions in virtual currencies.”83  Bal postulates 
that taxable income may be generated from the following: “the creation of 
virtual money ('mining'), the receipt of virtual currency as a gift (or reward 
for some achievements within the game), the receipt of virtual currency in 
exchange for (real or virtual) goods and services and the sale of digital 
money for real currency.”84  In their May 2013 report to the U.S. Senate 
Finance Committee, the GAO concluded that 
                                                                                                                       
Taxation of Virtual Worlds, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1027, 1031, 1037-38, 1040 (2009), 
available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1220923. 
 
81
 See Sarah Gruber, Note, Trust, Identity, and Disclosure: Are Bitcoin Exchanges the 
Next Virtual Havens for Money Laundering and Tax Evasion?, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
135, 196 (2013); Jennifer Isom, As Certain as Death and Taxes: Consumer 
Considerations of Bitcoin Transactions for When the IRS Comes Knocking 12-13 (Dec. 9, 
2013) (unpublished note), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2365493; Steven S. 
Chung, Note, Real Taxation of Virtual Commerce, 28 VA. TAX REV. 101, 131-34 (2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1097793 (proposing that virtual currencies 
integrating real cash into their economies through internal currency exchange systems 
behave like foreign currencies and should be taxed under the foreign currency rules of the 
Internal Revenue Code (Code); Bryan Camp, The Play's the Thing: A Theory of Taxing 
Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 61-62 (2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=980693. 
 
82
 Bal, supra note 12, at 354. 
 
83
 Id. at 351. 
 
84
 Id. at 354. 
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Virtual economies and the use of virtual currencies 
intended as alternatives to government-issued currencies 
are a recent phenomenon, and the extent to which their use 
results in tax noncompliance is unknown.  Given this 
uncertainty, available funding, and other priorities, IRS 
made a reasoned decision not to implement a compliance 
approach specific to virtual economies and currencies.
85
 
 
[36] Internal IRS research beginning during 2007 looked at virtual 
economies and “did not find strong evidence of the potential for tax 
noncompliance related to virtual economies, such as the number of U.S. 
taxpayers involved in such activity or the amount of federal tax revenue at 
risk.”86  After consulting with academics, tax practitioners, the IRS and 
others, the GAO reports that the following tax compliance risks germane 
to virtual currencies and virtual economies include: tax evasion, 
mischaracterization, and underreporting.
87
  However, the GAO is quick to 
observe that “[t]hese risks are not uni ue to virtual economies and 
currencies, as they also exist for other types of transactions, such as cash 
transactions, where there are not always clear records or third-party 
tracking and reporting of transactions.”88  Accordingly, the GAO identifies 
the following virtual currencies and economies compliance risks: lack of 
taxpayer knowledge regarding tax requirements; uncertainty over how to 
characterize income; uncertainty over how to calculate basis for gains; 
challenges with third-party reporting; and tax evasion.
89
  Akins, Chapman 
and Gordon conclude that “creating, or mining, bitcoin should be 
                                                     
85
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characterized as income for services and reported as such.  At the same 
time, transactions involving the exchange of bitcoin for legal currency, 
goods, or services should be reported as a capital gain or loss 
transaction.”90  On March 25, 2014, the IRS provided guidance stating that 
“[f]or federal tax purposes, virtual currency is treated as property.  General 
tax principles applicable to property transactions apply to transactions 
using virtual currency.”91 
 
[37] Omri Marian suggests that “[c]ryptocurrencies offer, at least 
theoretically, a near-perfect alternative to tax-evaders who can no longer 
find a safe haven in tax-haven jurisdictions.”92  Marian further observes 
that “[c]ryptocurrencies possess the traditional characteristics of tax 
havens: earnings are not subject to taxation and taxpayers’ anonymity is 
maintained.  Cryptocurrencies, however, also possess one added value: 
their operation is not dependent on the existence of financial 
institutions.”93 
 
D.  Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 
 
[38] A bureau of the U.S. Treasury Department, FinCEN, reports 
directly to the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.  Consisting 
                                                     
90
 Benjamin Akins et al., A Whole New World: Income Tax Considerations of the Bitcoin 
Economy, PITT. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2394738##. 
 
91
 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, NOTICE 2014-21, VIRTUAL CURRENCY GUIDANCE 
(2014); see also John D. McKinnon & Ryan Tracy, Bitcoin Investors Face the Real IRS, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB20001424052702303949704579461502538024502
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 Omri Y. Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies 'Super' Tax Havens?, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 38, 47 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2305863. 
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of only approximately 340 employees,
94
 FinCEN’s “mission is to 
safeguard the financial system from illicit use, combat money laundering 
and promote national security through the collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of financial intelligence and strategic use of financial 
authorities.”95  Among FinCEN’s responsibilities is to issue regulations 
and administer the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).
96
  The BSA requires that a 
wide range of financial institutions assist FinCEN by having effective anti-
money-laundering (AML) programs and by filing periodic reports with 
FinCEN and by maintaining appropriate records.  Examples of these 
financial institutions include: securities and futures broker/dealers, 
insurance companies, banks, casinos, other money services businesses, 
and certain trades or businesses such as automobile dealers.
97
  
 
[39] In March 2013, FinCEN provided interpretive guidance for those 
individuals and businesses offering virtual currencies and those engaged in 
providing money transmittal.
98
  While acknowledging that there are some 
troublesome virtual currency providers, FinCEN Director Jennifer Shasky 
Calvery observes that the impact of troublesome providers are mitigated 
by the positive innovative contributions provided by virtual currencies, 
and the financial inclusion that they might offer society.  A whole host of 
                                                     
94
 See Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) 
(statement of Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Director, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, 
United States Department of the Treasury). 
 
95
 Id. 
 
96
 Id. 
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 See Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Director, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Remarks at 
the Independent Armored Car Operators Association Cash in Transit Networking 
Conference (May 18, 2014).   
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 FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF 
FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING 
VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, (2013), available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/FIN-2013-G001.html. 
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emerging technologies “in the financial sector have proven their capacity 
to empower customers, encourage the development of innovative financial 
products, and expand access to financial services.  We want these 
advances to continue.”99  Observing that financial institutions have the 
responsibility to ensure transparency and integrity, Director Calvery states 
 
FinCEN’s guidance explains that administrators or 
exchangers of virtual currencies have registration 
requirements and a broad range of AML program, 
recordkeeping, and reporting responsibilities.  Those 
offering virtual currencies must comply with these 
regulatory requirements, and if they do so, they have 
nothing to fear from Treasury. 
 
The guidance explains how FinCEN’s ‘money transmitter’ 
definition applies to certain exchangers and system 
administrators of virtual currencies depending on the facts 
and circumstances of that activity.  “Those who use virtual 
currencies exclusively for common personal transactions 
like buying goods or services online” are not affected by 
this guidance. 
 
Those who are intermediaries in the transfer of virtual 
currencies from one person to another person, or to another 
location, are money transmitters that must register with 
FinCEN as MSB [money service business], unless an 
exception applies.  Some virtual currency exchangers have 
already registered with FinCEN as MSBs, though they have 
not necessarily identified themselves as money 
transmitters.
100
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 Calvery, supra note 94 at 10-11. 
 
100
 Calvery, supra note 94; see also FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-
2013-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, 
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, (2013), available at 
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E.  Digital Economy Task Force 
 
[40] The Digital Economy Task Force is an outgrowth of a conference 
held on June 14, 2013 at the World Bank and included officials from the 
European Central Bank, ICMEC, International Monetary Fund, Thomson 
Reuters, the U.S. Federal Reserve, U.S. Department of the Treasury’s 
Office on Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, and others.  With a 
view toward exploring “reasonable, constructive solutions, including best 
practice models to address the challenge of anonymity,” the Task Force 
issued its findings during March 2014 on the working group topics of: 
“Defining the Problem; Regulation; Law Enforcement; Human 
Rights/Financial Inclusion; and Interagency Cooperation and 
Coordination.”101  
 
F.  Virtual Currency Emerging Threats Working Group 
(VCET) 
 
[41] The FBI founded the Virtual Currency Emerging Threats Working 
Group (VCET) during early 2012 to address and “mitigate the cross-
programmatic threats arising from illicit actors’ use of virtual currency 
systems.”102  Membership of VCET consists of an interagency assortment 
of U.S. government, including within the DOJ: multiple U.S. Attorney’s 
offices; the Criminal Division’s sections of Asset Forfeiture and Money 
Laundering and Computer Crime and Intellectual Property; the Drug 
                                                     
101
 See Allen, supra note 18; see generally INT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED 
CHILDREN, Preface to THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: POTENTIAL, PERILS, AND PROMISES: A 
REPORT OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY TASK FORCE (Thomson Reuters 2014), available at 
http://thomsonreuters.com/business-unit/legal/digital-economy/digital-economy-task-
force-report.pdf (proposing regulations to frame the policy discussion in a manner that 
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who seek to abuse it). 
 
102
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Enforcement Administration and the FBI.
103
  Many other law enforcement 
groups have a mission concerning emerging payment systems and virtual 
currencies.  Far too numerous and clandestine to list them all, these 
include: local, state, federal and international law enforcement agencies, 
“the Secret Service and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 
Homeland Security Investigations (ICE/HSI) partner through the Secret 
Service’s Electronic Crimes Task Forces (ECTFs), which leverage the 
private sector, academia, and state and local law enforcement to support 
cyber crime investigations.”104  The “New Payment Methods Ad Hoc 
Working Group, a subgroup of the Terrorist Finance Working Group, led 
by the State Department.  The FBI specifically has issued numerous 
intelligence products related to virtual currency, many . . . co-authored 
with other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community.”105 
  
G.  Regulation of International Foreign Currencies 
 
[42] The Great Depression of the 1930s highlighted the need for an 
international institution to provide the stability of exchange rates, 
international monetary cooperation and balanced growth of trade among 
nations.  Therefore, in July 1944, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
was conceived by 45 countries meeting at Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire.
106 
 During December 1945, the IMF came into formal 
existence when its Articles of Agreement were adopted by its initial 29 
members.
107
  While virtual currencies were not contemplated during 1945, 
of relevance to our discussion is the fact that the IMF is the international 
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organization consisting of almost every signatory nation state (except for 
perhaps North Korea), and has the principal responsibility of coordinating 
foreign currency exchange, as noted by the following stated purposes of 
the IMF: 
 
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation 
through a permanent institution which provides the 
machinery for consultation and collaboration on 
international monetary problems. 
 
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of 
international trade, and to contribute thereby to the 
promotion and maintenance of high levels of 
employment and real income and to the 
development of the productive resources of all 
members as primary objectives of economic policy. 
 
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly 
exchange arrangements among members, and to 
avoid competitive exchange depreciation. 
 
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral 
system of payments in respect of current 
transactions between members and in the 
elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which 
hamper the growth of world trade. . . . 
108
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International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 ; 
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H.  Regulatory Challenges 
 
[43] The desire to formulate an enlightened and productive regulatory 
environment for virtual currencies has been the subject of Congressional 
hearings during recent months.
109
  Professor Sarah Jane Hughes offers her 
vision of a future regulatory fabric with her recommendation that 
Congress 
 
1. Retain the current division of regulation between the 
States and Federal Government    with prudential 
regulation of the non-depository providers of new 
payments systems with the States and retaining the anti-
money-laundering, anti-terrorism and economic 
sanctions regulations with the Federal Government. 
 
2. Make providers of virtual currencies comply with the 
customer-identification program and AML compliance 
program requirements of Sections 326 and 352 of the 
USA PATRIOT Act, and with the economic sanctions 
regulations enforced by OFAC, just as other payments 
systems providers do.  Virtual currency customers will 
have to reveal their identities to issuers of the 
currencies they use.  As a corollary, customers should 
get the same federal financial privacy rights that users 
of other payments products have under the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 and Title V of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 
 
3. Encourage FinCEN to clarify the manner in which 
customer-identification and AML compliance 
requirements apply to virtual currencies.  This is needed 
                                                     
109
 See Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 113th 
Cong. (2013), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/beyond-silk-road-
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to help banks ensure that they can do business with 
providers and users of virtual currencies and other 
payments innovators.  Second-stage innovations from 
distributed computing and database technologies could 
offer benefits to payments and commerce far beyond 
those that virtual currencies now offer.  If banks cannot 
determine how to comply with FinCEN regulations, for 
example, they may continue to terminate their 
relationships with payments innovators before the 
innovators can attract investors and users to make it to 
the second-stage technologies their current work may 
generate. 
 
4. Encourage payments systems innovators to adopt and 
publicize transparent payment systems rules for their 
own systems and even to compete for customers on the 
basis of the system rules they adopt.  It is too early to 
enact user protections for virtual currencies. 
 
5. Ignore the claims that 
a. additional regulation of virtual currencies will halt 
innovations, 
b. innovators deserve freedom from regulations that 
apply to other payments systems and their 
providers, and 
c. virtual currencies deserve a single federal licensure 
system that preempts State prudential regulation and 
licensure. 
 
6. Monitor the development of virtual currency providers 
in case they transform their products into commodities 
or securities and, if this happens, then decide whether 
regulating their products under the applicable 
regulations makes more sense. 
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7. Leave room for non-depository and depository 
providers of payments products to innovate in the 
virtual currency space. 
 
8. Authorize and fund a study of virtual currencies to be 
carried out by the Federal Reserve Board or pursuant to 
the Federal Advisory Committees Act by an inter-
agency task force and industry participants.
110
 
 
I.  Unique Enforcement Challenges & Monetary 
Stability 
 
[44] Virtual currencies present particularly difficult law enforcement 
challenges because of its: ability to transcend national borders in the 
fraction of a second; unique jurisdictional issues; and anonymity due to 
encryption.  Gabriel Michael observes that “Bitcoin is a disruptive 
technology that undermines the regulatory capacity of the state.”111  Mark 
Williams observes that 
                                                     
110
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on Econ. Policy and on Nat’l Sec. and Int’l Trade and Fin. of the S. Banking Comm., 
113
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 Cong. 2-3 (2013) (statement of Sarah Jane Hughes, University Scholar and Fellow 
in Commercial Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law), available at 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=
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 Gabriel J. Michael, Note, Anarchy and Property Rights in the Virtual World: How 
Disruptive Technologies Undermine the State and Ensure that the Virtual World Remains 
a "Wild West,” 21 (March 1, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233374.  See 
generally Shawn J. Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-
Member LLC, 109 NW. L. REV. COLLOQUY (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2366197 (discussing the consequences of Bitcoin as an 
independently wealthy software); Harri Lahdenpera, Payment and Financial Innovation, 
Reserve Demand and Implementation of Monetary Policy (Bank of Finland, Working 
Paper No. 26/2001, 2001) (observing that private substitutes for central bank money are 
available for the settlements of transactions, showing that effective monetary control by 
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http://ssrn.com/abstract=315479; and Malte Mӧser, Ranier Bӧhme & Dominic Breuker, 
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There are significant risks and uncertainties associated with 
virtual currencies that need to be fully measured before 
they are allowed to proliferate further or be adopted into the 
financial system.  Bitcoin presents numerous market-
related risks as it is decentralized, volatile, untraceable, 
unregulated, and provides no legal protection to customers.  
If Bitcoin, in its embryonic stage, were to replace the U.S. 
dollar, it would be economically disastrous causing trade to 
plummet, GDP to fall and unemployment levels and 
bartering to surge.  Bitcoin is an experiment that needs to 
remain in the laboratory until it can meet the basic 
standards required to become a beneficial transactional 
currency.  As a virtual commodity, Bitcoin remains 
extremely risky and needs to be closely watched.  To 
transform Bitcoin into a virtual currency would require 
regulation, centralization, creation of a legal framework 
and strong regulatory oversight.  However, these steps 
alone would not necessarily guarantee that chronically high 
price volatility would drop low enough to allow Bitcoin to 
become a trusted transactional currency.
112
 
 
J.  International & Jurisdictional Issues 
 
[45] The international reach and clientele of those engaged in virtual 
currency transactions present obvious law enforcement compliance 
problems.  Mythili Raman states that “transnational organized crime 
networks are increasingly involved in cybercrime, and can imperil 
consumers’ faith in emerging digital systems”  and “[i]nvestigations into 
illicit virtual currency businesses therefore often require considerable 
                                                                                                                       
Towards Risk Scoring of Bitcoin Transactions, available at 
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cooperation from international partners.”113  The investigation and 
takedown of Liberty Reserve, involved coordination of the law 
enforcement agencies in 17 nations.
114
   
 
[46] The practical inability to obtain customer transaction records 
remains one of the most significant problems confronting law enforcement 
efforts: 
 
Because decentralized systems lack any sort of 
administering authority to collect user information or 
receive legal process, investigators must rely on 
information collected by other sources, such as exchangers.  
Even if the target used a centralized system or exchanger, 
however, accurate customer records may still be difficult to 
obtain, or may not exist at all.
115
  
 
[47] Incongruent regulatory schemes present difficulty in regulating 
transactions and technology that appear to move at the speed of light.
116
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Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA L. REV. 1951 (2005) (discussing the struggle to adapt existing 
regulatory standards to new technologies and the Internet).  
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 Id.  See generally Christopher Kuner, Data Protection Law and International 
Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 1), 18 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 176 (2010), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496847 (discussing the increasing complexity of data 
protection law); Christopher Kuner, Data Protection Law and International Jurisdiction 
on the Internet (Part 2), 18 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 227 (2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1689495 (examining international jurisdiction and its 
relationship to data protection law).  
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 See generally Gargi Rajvanshi, Tapas K. Badhyopadhyay & Rajeev Gupta, Intricacies 
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2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2036935 (analyzing the issue of data 
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Paulina Pesch, Bitcoin: A First Legal Analysis – With Reference to German & US-
American Law (2014), available at 
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Virtual currencies, which facilitate the movement of money across the 
globe without involving a traditional financial services institution, exist in 
a legal and regulatory environment that may not address virtual currencies 
at all.
117
  Those countries having substandard anti-money laundering or 
know-your-customer regulatory oversight or those jurisdictions hostile to 
the United States attract these illicit operations.  Even in those 
jurisdictions having a cooperative regulatory environment, “the legal 
process for obtaining foreign records is relatively slow when compared to 
the near-instantaneous speed at which the virtual currency user can send 
the funds to another jurisdiction.”118 
 
K.  Anonymity Due to Encryption 
 
[48] The link between sophisticated encryption and virtual currency 
presents yet another difficult technical challenge for regulators, 
investigators, and others in the enforcement process such as 
prosecutors.
119
  Because virtual currencies lack a centralized authority for 
administration (such as a central bank or financial institution), the 
decentralized command and control functions of a virtual currency rely 
typically on an encryption algorithm.
120
  Therefore, “[t]hese encryption-
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based currencies, also known as cryptocurrencies, lack a central 
administering authority that might otherwise possess valuable evidence.  
In addition, users of these currencies often encrypt their digital wallets, 
complicating our efforts to seize and forfeit criminal proceeds.”121  
Moreover, 
 
To be clear, virtual currency is not necessarily synonymous 
with anonymity.  A convertible virtual currency with 
appropriate anti-money laundering and know-your-
customer controls, as required by U.S. law, can safeguard 
its system from exploitation by criminals and terrorists in 
the same way any other money services business could.  As 
virtual currency systems develop, it is imperative to law 
enforcement interests that those systems comply with 
applicable anti-money laundering and know-your-customer 
controls.
122
 
 
IV.  BITCOIN 
 
[49] Based on ideas from b-money
123
 and Hashcash,
124
 “[a] Bitcoin is a 
fixed-value cryptographic object represented as a chain of digital 
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signatures over the transactions in which the coin was used.”125  Bitcoin 
“aims to be completely distributed, free of central authorities or points of 
control, and at least somewhat anonymous.”126  Bitcoin is a virtual 
currency based on a decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P) network, much like 
BitTorrent, the popular protocol for sharing files over the Internet, such as 
music, games and video.
127
  Boston University’s Mark Williams observes 
that “[s]ince 2009, over seventy-five virtual currencies have been created 
and are traded globally representing about $11 billion in stated market 
value.”128  As shown in Figure 2, Bitcoin has grown rapidly since 2009 
from a mere idea to a legitimate currency by mid-2013, with bitcoins in 
circulation, its market capitalization having total value in excess of $14 
billion (U.S.) during December 2013.
129
  One 2013 estimate states that 
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http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/ETD-UT-2011-08-
4150/BRONLEEWE-MASTERS-REPORT.pdf?sequence=1 (discussing the use of 
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Bitcoin transactions reportedly average about 30 transactions per minute, 
contrasted with about 200,000 transactions per minute for VISA.
130
   
 
Figure 2:  Bitcoin Market Capitalization
131
 
 
 
 
[50] By Thanksgiving of 2013, an increase in media attention and 
publicity surrounding U.S. Senate hearings resulted in Bitcoin increasing 
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in value during one seven-day period from $615 per Bitcoin to more than 
$1,000 per Bitcoin on the Mt. Gox exchange, resulting in a total market 
capitalization in excess of $11 billion in US dollars.
132
  Figure 3 illustrates 
the volatility of Bitcoin market price in US dollars during 2013, and 
through mid-February 2014.
133
  On Tuesday, February 24, 2014, following 
the failure of the online marketplace, the price of Bitcoin, in what must be 
regarded as "an astonishing price recovery immediately following bad 
news," stood at $525 per Bitcoin, not far from where it was when the Mt. 
Gox news emerged on Monday night.
134
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
132
 See Nick Bilton, N.Y. Times Bits: A Surge in Value for Bitcoin and Currencies Similar 
to It, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Nov. 27, 2013, 4:16 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/27/a-rise-in-attention-and-price-for-crypto-
currencies/?_r=0; see also Marie Brière, Kim Oosterlinck & Ariane Szafarz, Virtual 
Currency, Tangible Return: Portfolio Diversification with Bitcoins (Working Paper, Sept. 
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2324780. 
 
133
 Bitcoin Market Price in US Dollars, BLOCKCHAIN, available at 
https://blockchain.info/charts/market-price (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
 
134
 Hiroko Tabuchi & Ben Protess, Bitcoin Investors See Bright Side in Site’s Failure, 
INT’L N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2014, at 15, available at 
http://ihtbd.com/ihtuser/print/old%20THT/27-02-2014/a2702x15xxxxxxxxx.pdf. 
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Figure 3: Bitcoin Market Price
135
 
(0,000,000s omitted) 
 
 
[51] Approximately 90% ($10 billion) of the total virtual currency 
market value is represented by Bitcoin; but, “[b]ased on its volatile price 
behavior, Bitcoin is not a virtual currency but a high-risk virtual 
commodity, in a hyper-asset bubble that has begun to pop” and “Bitcoin 
the pseudo currency and Bitcoin the low-cost payment system are 
dependent on each other and inseparable.”136  Barber, Boyen, Shi, and 
                                                     
135
 BLOCKCHAIN.INFO, supra note 131.  
 
136
 Williams, supra note 14, at 1; see also id. at n. 2 (observing “Bitcoin is the e uivalent 
of the locomotive while the payment system is the rails that allow it to move.  If the 
engine does not work no matter how well built the rails, they won’t be used.”).  See 
generally George Selgin, Synthetic Commodity Money (Univ. of Ga. Dept. of Econ., 
Working Paper, Apr. 10, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2000118 
(discussing Bitcoin as a synthetic commodity currency); David Groshoff, Kickstarter My 
Heart: Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowdfunding Constraints 
and Bitcoin Bubbles, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2313396 (proposing a re-regulatory scheme that may provide a 
solution to combat the excessive volatility of Bitcoin bubbles); Joseph Chen-Yu Wang, A 
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Uzun observe that “Bitcoin assumes that the majority of nodes in its 
network are honest, and resorts to a majority vote mechanism for double 
spending avoidance, and dispute resolution.  In contrast, most e-cash 
schemes require a centralized bank who is trusted for purposes of e-cash 
issuance, and double-spending detection.”137  Hammad Siddiqi contends 
that the market for Bitcoin is a “complex system without a stable 
equilibrium.”138 
 
[52] Bitcoin was created during 2009 by Satoshi Nakamoto, believed by 
many to be a pseudonymous hacker or hackers.
139
  Moreover 
 
Nakamoto was inspired by an article written back in 1998 
by Wei Dai, a graduate from the University of Washington.  
Dai envisioned a system in which “untraceable 
pseudonymous entities . . . [could] cooperate with each 
other more efficiently, by providing them with a medium of 
exchange and a method of enforcing contracts.”  He sought 
to create a medium of exchange that avoided the need for 
                                                                                                                       
Simple Macroeconomic Model of Bitcoin (Bitquant Research Laboratories, Working 
Paper No. 1, Feb. 11, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2394024 (suggesting 
that bitcoin will not fall victim to the liquidity trap suggested by some economists).  
 
137
 Simon Barber, Xavier Boyen, Elaine Shi & Ersin Uzun, Bitter to Better    Ho  to 
Make Bitcoin a Better Currency, in FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY; 
16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, FC 2012 399, 400 (Angelos D. Keromytis ed., 
2012), available at http://crypto.stanford.edu/~xb/fc12/bitcoin.pdf. 
 
138
 Hammad Siddiqi, The Routes to Chaos in the Bitcoins Market, (Working Paper, Feb. 
17, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2396997. 
 
139
 See Barber, Boyen, Shi & Uzun, supra note 137, at 1.  But see Julianne Pepitone, 
Bitcoin Creator Satoshi Nakamoto Found, Newsweek Says, NBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2014), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/bitcoin-creator-satoshi-nakamoto-found-
newsweek-says-n45871 (identifies 64-year-old California resident as the author), and 
Nathaniel Popper & Rachel Abrams, Bitcoin’s Mysterious Creator Is Said to Be 
Identified, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014, 3:51 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/newsweek-unmasks-bitcoin-founder-stirring-
ire/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (raising doubts about the Newsweek report). 
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intermediaries in electronic transactions, and one in which 
government involvement “[was] not [only] temporarily 
destroyed but permanently forbidden and permanently 
unnecessary. ”  
 
Drawing on Dai’s vision, Nakamoto created Bitcoin, the 
world’s first private, decentralized digital currency.  Unlike 
traditional fiat currencies, whose value is determined by 
law and underwritten by the state, Bitcoin is not backed by 
a government or legal entity.  Bitcoin does not have a 
central authority in charge of the money supply or a central 
clearing house.  Indeed, no traditional financial institutions 
are involved in Bitcoin transactions. Instead, users perform 
all steps of the transactions themselves.
140
 
 
A.  How Bitcoin Works 
 
[53] Bitcoin can be described as a “Proof-of-Work (PoW) based 
currency that allows users to generate digital coins by performing 
computations.”141  Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir report that “[p]articipants 
begin using bitcoin by first acquiring a program called a Bitcoin wallet 
                                                     
140
 Nicholas Plassaras, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin Within the Reach 
of the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INT'L L. 377, 383 (2013) (quoting Morgen Peck, Bitcoin: The 
Cryptoanarchists’ Ans er to Cash, IEEE Spectrum (June 2012), available at 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/bitcoin-the-cryptoanarchists-answer-to-cash 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2014); Wei Dai, B-Money (1998), http://weidai.com/bmoney.txt 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2014)); see also EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 127, at 6; 
J.P., Virtual Currency: Bits and Bob, THE ECONOMIST (June 13, 2011, 8:30 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/06/virtual-currency (last viewed Apr. 14, 
2014). 
 
141
 Elli Androulaki, Ghassan O. Karame, Marc Roeschlin, Tobias Scherer & Srdjan 
Capkun, Evaluating User Privacy in Bitcoin, in FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA 
SECURITY; 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, FC 2013 34, 34 (Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi 
ed., 2013), available at 
http://book.itep.ru/depository/bitcoin/User_privacy_in_bitcoin.pdf. 
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and one or more Bitcoin addresses.”142  Stored on a computer’s hard drive 
as electronic files, Bitcoins “can be accumulated or transferred just like an 
e-mail.  Software algorithms embedded in the online Bitcoin network 
protect against fraud and ensure that the files are not counterfeited.”143  By 
using a peer-to-peer network to distribute a master transparent public 
ledger called the Blockchain, each Bitcoin transaction is registered for all 
to see.  The Blockchain is used to verify that the identical Bitcoins haven’t 
been used in a previous transaction, thereby preventing “double spending” 
of the same Bitcoins.
144
  Brito and Castillo observe 
 
[T]ransactions on the Bitcoin network are not denominated 
in dollars or euros or yen as they are on PayPal, but are 
instead denominated in bitcoins.  This makes it a virtual 
currency in addition to a decentralized payments network.  
The value of the currency is not derived from gold or 
government fiat, but from the value that people assign to it.  
                                                     
142
 Dorit Ron & Adi Shamir, Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction 
Graph, in FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY; 17TH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE, FC 2013 6, 8 (Ahmad-Reza Sageghi ed., 2013), available at 
https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/584.pdf.   
 
143
 Plassaras, supra note 140, at 379.  See generally Jӧrg Becker, Dominic Breuker, 
Tobias Heide, Justus Holler, Hans Peter Rauer & Rainer Bӧhme, Can We Afford Integrity 
by Proof-of-Work? Scenarios Inspired by the Bitcoin Currency (Workshop on the 
Economics of Information Security WEIS 2012 Working Paper, Feb. 24, 2012), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2041492 (discussing the intricacies of the Bitcoin system); 
Sarah Jeong, The Bitcoin Protocol as Law, and the Politics of a Stateless Currency 
(Harv. L. Sch. Seminar “The Constitutional Law of Money” Working Paper, May 8, 
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294124 (discussing the complex Bitcoin 
technology). 
 
144
 Jerry Brito & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin: A Primer for Policymakers, George Mason 
University Mercatus Center 4 (Dec. 19, 2013).  But see Nicolas Houy, It Will Cost You 
Nothing to 'Kill' a Proof-of-Stake Crypto-Currency 2, 4 (University of Lyon-GATE 
Working Paper, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393940.  But see generally 
Androulaki et al., supra note 141 (describing several authors who contend that double-
spending attacks can be successful). 
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The dollar value of a bitcoin is determined on an open 
market, just as is the exchange rate between different world 
currencies.
145
 
 
[54] Worldwide in scope, Bitcoin “can be used as a currency for all 
kinds of transactions (for both virtual and real goods and services), thereby 
competing with official currencies . . .  [However,] it does not have a 
central clearing house, nor are there any financial or other institutions 
involved in the transactions.”146  Bitcoin exists with “no central authority 
in charge of the money supply [since] . . . the money supply is determined 
by a specific type of [data] ‘mining’ activity.  It depends on the amount of 
resources (electricity and CPU time) that ‘miners’ devote to solving 
specific mathematical problems.”147  The Bitcoin mining process 
“involves repeatedly running a computationally intensive mathematical 
function (called a cryptographic hash function) on a set of randomly 
seeded inputs until a specific pattern pops up. . . .  The results are 
publicized on the Internet for the rest of the Bitcoin network.”148  At the 
time of writing, March 2014, the Bitcoin network hash rate (total number 
of hashes per second made by all players) is estimated to be in the 
neighborhood of 30,000 trillion hashes per second (30,000 Thash/s), 
having increased at an astonishing rate due to “more efficient specialized 
mining hardware now available on the market.”149  At this rate, Bitcoin 
                                                     
145
 Brito & Castillo, supra note 144, at 4. 
 
146
 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 127, at 21; see also Marc Pilkington, Bitcoin 
and Complexity Theory: Some Methodological Implications (University of Burgundy 
Working Paper, Oct. 14, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2340007 
(investigating the foundations of Bitcoin).  
 
147
 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 127, at 21. 
 
148
 Paul Ford, Marginally Useful, MIT TECH. REV.  (Feb. 18, 2014), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/review/524691/marginally-useful. 
 
149
 E-mail from Edward W. Felten, Robert E. Kahn Professor of Computer Science and 
Public Affairs & Director, Center for Information Technology Policy, Princeton 
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has become one of the largest distributed computational efforts ever.  Over 
a year earlier, with a hash rate of less than 1% the current rate, Kroll, 
Davey and Felten observed that “taken as a whole, the Bitcoin transaction 
verification network is more powerful than the combined computing 
power of the top 500 supercomputers in the world, giving pause to anyone 
concerned about whether the costs of transaction verification in Bitcoin 
are acceptable.”150  I have written this article to be readable by those not 
possessing an advanced degree in computer science.  Therefore, while I 
present minimal math, a wealth of cryptographic rich research is 
available.
151
  Babaioff, Dobzinski, Oren and Zohar present the following 
account: 
                                                                                                                       
University, to Lawrence J. Trautman (March 6, 2014) (on file with author); see also 
Bitcoin Hash Rate, BLOCKCHAIN, available at http://blockchain.info/charts/hash-rate. 
 
150
 Kroll, Davey & Felten, supra note 123, at 8. 
 
151
 See generally Androulaki, supra note 141 (analyzing the privacy guarantees of Bitcoin 
in a setting where Bitcoin is used as a primary currency for daily transactions of 
individuals); Marcin Andrychowicz et al., Secure Multiparty Comnputations on Bitcoin 
(2014), available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/784 (showing how the unique properties of 
Bitcoin can be used in the area of secure multiparty computation protocols (MPCs)); 
Marcin Andrychowicz et al., Fair Two-Party Computations Via Bitcoin Deposits (2014), 
available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/837 (explaining how Bitcoin can be used to 
obtain fairness in a two-party secure computation protocol); Marcin Andrychowicz et al., 
How to Deal With Malleability of BitCoin Transactions (2013), available at 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.3230 (discussing the malleability of Bitcoin transactions); 
Moshe Babaioff et al., On Bitcoin and Red Balloons, ACM Conference on Electronic 
Commerce (EC’12) (2012), available at 
http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/~avivz/pubs/12/Bitcoin_EC0212.pdf (proposing a modification 
to the Bitcoin protocol to help eliminate various problems with the virtual currency 
scheme); Alex Coventry, NooShare: A Decentralized Ledger of Shared Computational 
Resources (2012), available at http://web.mit.edu/alex_c/www/nooshare.pdf (describing 
NooShare, a decentralized ledger similar to Bitcoin); Ittay Eyal & Emin Gün Sirer, 
Majority is not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable,  (forthcoming in Proceeds of the 
18
th
 International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, March 
2014), available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243 (presenting an attack on the Bitcoin 
protocol that would result in Bitcoin ceasing to be a decentralized currency); Ilja 
Gerhardt & Timo Hanke, Homomorphic Payment Addresses and the Pay-to-Contract 
Protocol (2012), available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1212.3257 (proposing the design of a 
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The basic setup of electronic transactions relies on public 
key cryptography.  When Alice wants to transfer 50 coins 
to Bob, she signs a transaction using her private key.  
Hence, everyone can verify that Alice herself initiated this 
transaction (and not someone else).  Bob, in turn, is 
identified as the target of the transfer using his public key.  
For the money to be actually transferred from Alice’s 
account to Bob’s account, some entity has to keep track of 
the last owner of the coins, and to mark Bob as the new 
owner.  Otherwise, Alice could “double spend” her money.  
First transfer the coins to Bob, then transfer the same coins 
again to Charlie.  Traditionally, this role was fulfilled by 
banks.  In return, banks tended to charge high fees, for 
example in international transfers.
152
 
 
[55] A report by the European Central Bank states that “[b]itcoins are 
divisible to eight decimal places enabling their use in any kind of 
transaction, regardless of the value. . . .  [T]ransactions are carried out 
faster and more cheaply than with traditional means of payment.  
Transaction fees, if any, are very low and no bank account fee is 
charged.”153  Luther and Olson note that crypto-currency Bitcoin 
“functions as a public record-keeping device.  As such, it serves as an 
                                                                                                                       
deterministic bitcoin wallet); Fergal Reid & Martin Harrigan, An Analysis of Anonymity 
in the Bitcoin System, available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1107.4524 (investigating an 
alleged theft of Bitcoins using various techniques); Ron & Shamir, supra note 142; Meni 
Rosenfeld, Analysis of Hashrate-based Double-spending (2014), available at 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1402.2009 (analyzing the stochastic processes of Bitcoin, which 
underlie typical attacks and assessing the resulting probabilities of success); Emily Shen, 
Elaine Shi & Brent Watters, Predicate Privacy in Encryption Systems (2008), available 
at https://www.cs.umd.edu/users/elaine/docs/sympredenc.pdf (analyzing predicate 
encryption). 
 
152
 Babaioff et al., supra note 151, at 16-17. 
 
153
 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 127, at 21. 
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alternative to historically accepted monies while enabling transactions in 
much the same way.”154  Teigland, Yetis, and Larsson report that “[a] deal 
in December 2012 with French financial firms Aqoba and Credit Mutuel 
led to Bitcoin-Central, a currency exchange, being awarded an 
International Bank ID number and becoming a Payment Services Provider 
e ual to services such as PayPal.”155 
 
B.  Bitcoin Vulnerabilities 
 
[56] Any discussion of virtual currencies must acknowledge that any 
such mathematically devised protocol is vulnerable to superior future 
cryptography advances that trump our present understanding of the 
boundaries of cybersecurity.  Kroll, Davie, and Felten observe that 
“[s]uccess of the Bitcoin economy re uires that Bitcoin’s distributed 
protocols operate and remain stable.”156  Assuming that those involved 
behave as incentivized and in their own perceived best interest, three types 
of consensuses are required (each depending mutually on the other two) 
for Bitcoin to remain a success: 
 
1. Consensus about Rules: Players must agree on criteria to 
determine which transactions are valid.  Only valid 
                                                     
154
 William J. Luther & Josiah Olson, Bitcoin is Memory 2 (Kenyon College Working 
Paper, June 7, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2275730. 
 
155
 Teigland et al., supra note 129, at 3. 
 
156
 Kroll, Davey & Felten,, supra note 123, at 6; see also Mitsuru Iwamura, Yukinobu 
Kitamura & Tsutomu Matsumoto, Is Bitcoin the Only Cryptocurrency in the Town? 
Economics of Cryptocurrency and Fredrich A. Hayek 12 (Hitotsubashi University 
Institute of Economic Research Working Paper, Feb. 28, 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405790 (concluding that Bitcoin will be taken over by other 
cryptocurrencies with similar but somewhat improved technical as well as security 
structures); Tetsuya Saito, Bitcoin: A Search-Theoretic Approach, INT’L J. INNOVATION 
IN THE DIGITAL ECON. 16 (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405013 (assessing the stability of Bitcoin in the market as a 
payment method). 
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transactions will be memorialized in the Bitcoin log; but 
this requires agreement on how to determine validity. 
 
2. Consensus about State:  Players must agree on which 
transactions have actually occurred, that is, they must agree 
on the history of the Bitcoin economy, so that there is a 
common understanding of who owns which coin at any 
given time. 
 
3. Consensus that Bitcoins are Valuable: Players must agree 
that Bitcoins have value so that players will be willing to 
accept Bitcoins in payment.
157
  
 
[57] For purposes of our Bitcoin vulnerabilities discussion, I suggest 
that the following issues are among the most significant threats: (1) the 
51% attack, (2) The Goldfinger attack, (3) privacy concerns, and (4) loss 
of confidence due to a significant decline in the price of Bitcoin resulting 
in a disincentive to mine.  Many other potential threats exist such as: a 
deflationary spiral; denial-of-service attacks; or hoarding of Bitcoin due to 
its appreciation potential.
158
   
 
[58] Among attacks intended to “destabilize consensus about the rules 
or state of Bitcoin,”159 the  1% attack arises when Bitcoin’s miners (or a 
single individual or cartel acting in concert) hold a majority of the 
network’s capacity for puzzle-solving (mining).160  This is a known design 
                                                     
157
 Kroll, Davey & Felten, supra note 123, at 6. 
 
158
 See Barber, Boyen, Shi & Uzun, supra note 137, at 6; and Marie Vasek, Micah 
Thornton & Tyler Moore, Empirical Analysis of Denial-of-Service Attacks in the Bitcoin 
Ecosystem 1, available at http://fc14.ifca.ai/bitcoin/papers/bitcoin14_submission_17.pdf. 
 
159
 Kroll, Davey & Felten, supra note 123, at 11. 
 
160
 See Barber, Boyen, Shi & Uzun, supra note 137, at 6.  See also Vasek et al., supra 
note 158, at 11; See also Philipp Güring & Ian Grigg, Bitcoin & Gresham’s La  – The 
Economic Inevitability of Collapse 5 (Oct.-Dec. 2011), available at 
http://iang.org/papers/BitcoinBreachesGreshamsLaw.pdf (contending that botnets can 
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problem because the Bitcoin developers made the assumption that an 
effective cartel of miners would never develop.  Kroll et al.. observe:  
 
[A] cartel can change any rules which are enforced by 
consensus and players who are not in the cartel will likely 
be obliged to follow. . .  An interesting facet of mining 
cartels is that they can censor certain transactions.  The 
cartel can choose to ignore any transaction it does not want 
appended to the log . . .  [However,] a 51% cartel attack is 
unlikely to generate enough reward within the Bitcoin 
economy to be worthwhile to the attacker.
161
 
 
[59] In a highly controversial paper, Cornell University computer 
scientists Ittay Eyal and Emin Gün Sirer warn that “[t]he Bitcoin 
ecosystem is open to manipulation, and potential takeover by miners 
seeking to maximize their rewards . . . [because] [h]igher revenues can 
lead new rational miners to join selfish miner pools, leading to a collapse 
of the decentralized currency.”162  Eyal and Gün Sirer further contend that  
                                                                                                                       
operate at a zero cost of power- therefore, stolen electricity will drive out honest mining, 
resulting in inevitable collapse of Bitcoin). 
 
161
 Kroll et al., supra note 123 at 11-13. 
 
162
 Eyal & Gün Sirer, supra note 151 at 15. Compare Ed Felton, Game Theory and 
Bitcoin, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Nov. 11, 2013), https://freedom-to-
tinker.com/blog/felton/game-thory-and-bitcoin/ (disagreeing with the findings of the Eyal 
and Gün Sirer paper), and Ed Felton, Bitoin Isn’t So Broken After All, FREEDOM TO 
TINKER (Nov. 7, 2013), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felton/bitcoin-inst-so-broken-
after-all (finding contrary to the Eyal and Gün Sirer paper that a group of minors will not 
be stable) with Eyal & Gün Sirer, Response to Feedback on Selfish Mining, HACKING 
DISTRIBUTED (Nov. 14, 2013, 9:45 AM), 
https://hackingdistributed.com/2013/11/14/response-to-feedback-on-selfish-mining and 
E-mail from Ittay Eyal, post-doc, Systems and Networking Group. Dep’t of Computer 
Science, Cornell University to Lawrence J. Trautman (Mar. 10, 2014, 7:58 CST) (on file 
with author) (contending Felton’s main comment arises from a misunderstanding of a 
blog post published by Eyal & Gün Sirer and not with the actual paper).  But cf., Arvind 
Narayanan & Andrew Miler, Why the Cornell Paper on Bitcoin Mining is Important, 
FREEDOM TO TINKER (Nov. 9, 2013), https://freedom-to-
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[T]he upper bound on threshold size is 1/3: the protocol 
will never be safe against attacks by a selfish mining pool 
that commands more than 33% of the total mining power of 
the network.  This upper bound is substantially lower than 
the 50% figure currently assumed, and difficult to achieve 
in practice.
163
 
 
[60] The Goldfinger attack is named after the James Bond novel by Ian 
Flemming and movie of the same name.  The novel’s villain attempts to 
ruin the gold-backed U.S. currency by causing the underlying gold held at 
Fort Knox to become radioactive and therefore worthless.
164
  Accordingly, 
in a Bitcoin Goldfinger attack, a 51% majority of miners seeks to “destroy 
the Bitcoin economy in order to achieve utility outside the Bitcoin 
economy.”165  Kroll et al. identify at least three potential (and expensive) 
motivations for such an attack: (1) a sovereign or institution may 
determine to disrupt Bitcoin for its own purposes (2) attack by a non-state 
actor (public protest such as an Occupy Bitcoin, etc.); and (3) an attacker 
may be motivated by an investment gain such as one derived by selling-
short the underlying Bitcoin and closing the position at a gain.
166
   
 
                                                                                                                       
tinker.com/blog/randomwalker/why-the-cornell-paper-on-bitcoin-mining-is-important/ 
(observing that Eyal & Gün Sirer's paper is the first time a serious issue has been raised 
with Bitcoin’s consensus mechanism and has exploited the peer-to-peer aspect of the 
system).  
 
163
 Eyal & Gün Sirer, supra note 151 at 3. 
 
164
 IAN FLEMING, GOLDFINGER (Thomas & Mercer 2012); see also GOLDFINGER  (Eon 
Productions 1964). 
 
165
 Kroll et al., supra note 123 at 13. 
 
166
 Kroll et al., supra note 123 at 13 (citing J. Becker et al., Can We Afford Integrity by 
Proof-of-Work? Scenarios Inspired by the Bitcoin Currency, in WORKSHOP ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY(2012) (emphasizing proposition two i.e. non-
state actors)). 
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[61] Privacy concerns constitute another significant threat to the future 
viability of Bitcoin.  Research conducted by Androulaki, Karame, 
Roeschlin, Scherer and Capkun find:  
 
[T]he current measures adopted by Bitcoin are not enough 
to protect the privacy of users if Bitcoin were to be used as 
a digital currency in realistic settings . . . [I]f Bitcoin is 
used as a digital currency to support the daily transactions 
of users in a typical university environment, then behavior-
based clustering techniques can unveil, to a large extent, 
the profiles of 40% of Bitcoin users, even if these users try 
to enhance their privacy by manually creating new 
addresses.
167
 
 
[62] The last on our abbreviated list of selected threats lies in the 
potential “death spiral”168 that will likely be created if the price of Bitcoin 
declines to a point where there is no longer an economic incentive to mine 
                                                     
167
 Androulaki et al., supra note 141 at 15. See also Joseph Bonneau et al., Mixcoin 
Anonymity for Bitcoin with Accountable Mixes, Financial Cryptography & Data 
Conference (Mar. 307, 2014), available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/077 (last updated 
April 21, 2014) (proposing a protocol to facilitate anonymous payments utilizing the 
Bitcoin system); Philip Koshy, Diana Koshy & Patrick McDaniel, An Analysis of 
Anonymity in Bitcoin Using P2P Network Traffic, Financial Cryptography & Data 
Conference (Mar. 3-7, 2014), available at 
http://ifca.ai/fc14/papers/fc14_submission_71.pdf; (developing "heuristics for identifying 
ownership relationships between Bitcoin addresses and IP addresses"); Malte Möser, 
Anonymity of Bitcoin Transactions: An Analysis of Mixing Services, Münster Bitcoin 
Conference (July 17-18, 2013), https://www.wi.uni-
muenster.de/sites/default/files/public/department/itsecurity/mbc13/mbc13-moeser-
paper.pdf (examining three types of services that claim to increase Bitcoin anonymity); 
Michele Spagnuolo, Frederico Maggi & Stefano Zanero, BitIodine: Extracting 
Intelligence from the Bitcoin Network, Financial Cryptography & Data Conference (Mar. 
3-7, 2014), available at http://fc14.ifca.ai/papers/fc14_submission_11.pdf(presenting 
BitIodine, a modular framework that can be used to build a library for more complex 
Bitcoin forensic analysis tools).  
 
168
 Kroll et al., supra note 123 at 8.  
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additional Bitcoin.  For a currency of any type to maintain value it must 
sustain confidence in its ability to serve as a store of value.  Kroll, Davey, 
and Felten depict the following scenario: 
 
[L]oss of confidence in Bitcoin could cause the Bitcoin 
price to go down, a falling price lowers the incentive to 
mine and the equilibrium mining rate, lower mining rate 
leads to the currency being easier to subvert, and this leads 
to a further loss of confidence in the currency.  Such a 
death spiral reflects the perceived loss of consensus in the 
value game . . .
169
 
 
C.  The Promise of Bitcoin 
 
[63] Brito and Castillo in their report, Bitcoin: A Primer for 
Policymakers, highlight the many ways in which Bitcoin may be used to 
“improve the  uality of life for the world’s poorest.  Improving access to 
basic financial services is a promising antipoverty techni ue.”170  The 
authors state “[t]o better understand why people might want to use 
Bitcoin, it helps to think of it, not necessarily as a replacement for 
traditional currencies, but rather as a new payments system.”171  The lower 
cost of Bitcoin assists small businesses by providing an alternative to 
expensive credit cards, enabling migrants to make cheaper remittances of 
payments to their families in developing countries, helping to protect 
individuals from censorship and capital controls, providing oppressed 
groups with financial privacy, and facilitating innovation and 
micropayments.
172
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 Id. 
 
170
 Brito & Castillo, supra note 144 at 14, (citing MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BANKER TO THE 
POOR: MICRO-LENDING AND THE BATTLE AGAINST WORLD POVERTY (Public Affairs, 
2003). 
 
171
 Brito & Castillo, supra note 144 at 10. 
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D.  Lower Transaction Costs 
 
[64] Bitcoin offers the promise of substantially lower transaction costs 
for small merchants worldwide.  Because Bitcoin transactions do not 
involve a third party (financial intermediary or institution), costly credit 
card charges are avoided. 
 
Credit cards have greatly expanded the ease of transacting, 
but their use comes with considerable costs to merchants.  
Businesses that wish to offer the option of credit card 
payments to their customers must first pay for a merchant 
account with each credit card company.  Depending on the 
terms of agreement with each credit card company, 
businesses must then pay a variety of authorization fees, 
transaction fees, statement fees, interchange fees, and 
customer-service fees, among other charges.
173
   
 
Bitcoin makes lower transaction costs possible, thus enabling (1) financial 
services to those populations currently without access to financial services, 
and (2) a multitude of micropayment services.  In addition, the ability to 
                                                     
173
 Brito & Castillo, supra note 144 at 10. See generally Wilko Bolt, Retail Payment 
Systems: Competition, Innovation, and Implications (De Nederlandsche Bank, Working 
Paper No. 362, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2192046 (assessing key 
factors that affect pricing, competition, and incentives to innovate in the payment 
market); Marc Bourreau & Marianne Verdier, Interchange Fees and Innovation in 
Payment Systems, (2013), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2244160 (analyzing the 
impact of interchange fees on consumers' and merchants' incentives to adopt a payment 
instrument); David S. Evans et al., Interchange Fees: The Economics and Regulation of 
What Merchants Pay for Cards, (Dec. 17, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974023 (examining the economics and regulation of 
interchange fees); David S. Evans, Payments Innovation and Interchange Fees 
Regulation: How Inverting the Merchant-Pays Business Model Would Affect the Extent 
and Direction of Innovation (June 27, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878825 (examining the possible impact of a reduction in 
interchange fees on innovation involving payment cards).  
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make the transfer of funds available with lower transaction costs bodes 
well for global poverty reduction “by improving access to capital.”174 
 
E.  Remittances 
 
[65] One of the major potential benefits provided by Bitcoin may be in 
the marketplace for remittances sent by immigrants in developed countries 
(where the jobs are) to their relatives back home in developing countries.  
According to World Bank estimates, “remittances totalled [sic] USD 440 
billion in 2010, of which USD 325 billion went to developing countries, 
involving some 192 million migrants or 3.0% of world population.  For 
some individual recipient countries, remittances can be as high as a third 
of GDP.”175  The World Bank reports that “[r]emittance prices are high for 
many reasons, including underdeveloped financial infrastructure in some 
countries, limited competition, regulatory obstacles, lack of access to the 
banking sector by remittance senders and/or receivers, and difficulties for 
migrants to obtain the necessary identification documentation to enter the 
financial mainstream.”176  In addition, 
 
[T]he single most important factor leading to high 
remittance prices is lack of transparency in the market.  It is 
difficult for consumers to compare prices because there are 
several variables that compose remittance prices.  Prices for 
remittances are frequently made up of a fee charged for 
sending a certain amount, a margin taken on the exchange 
rate when remittances are paid and received in different 
currencies, and, at times, a fee charged to the recipient of 
                                                     
174
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http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/0,
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the funds.  These fee components may also vary according 
to how the receiver is paid (i.e. cash or by creating an 
account), the speed of the transfer, and the ability of the 
sender to provide information about the recipient (i.e. bank 
account number). 
 
In addition, a lack of transparency in the market has had the 
impact of reducing competition, as consumers tend to 
patronize traditional market players because they are not 
aware of other players, and/or cannot compare the services 
they usually buy against other product.
177
 
 
[66] The average cost of remitting funds during the 4
th
 quarter of 2013 
from G20 nations is reported by the World Bank to be 8.16%, contrasted 
with a cost of 12.33% for using a commercial bank to send funds.
178
  The 
cost of using post offices stands at 4.12% for the same time period; cash 
products are among the least expensive averaging 7.3 %; and “[a]ccount-
to-account products are among the most expensive, with an average cost 
of 12.74 percent; however, the cost of transferring money within the same 
bank or to a partner bank is significantly lower.”179  The cost of remitting 
funds varies widely from country to country with Italy, Russia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States below the average cost found among G8 
countries of 8.20 percent during the 4
th
 quarter of 2013.
180
  Of particular 
note, “South Africa remains the costliest remittance sending country in the 
G20 group, with an average of 18.16 [percent], followed by Japan with an 
average of 15.73 percent.  The least expensive sending country, together 
                                                     
177
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178
 World Bank, An Analysis of Trends in the Average Total Cost of Migrant Remittance 
Services, 8 REMITTANCE PRICES WORLDWIDE 8, 2 (Dec. 2013), available at 
https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/RPW_Report_Dec2013.pdf. 
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with Russia, is Saudi Arabia (4.19 [percent]), followed by Korea (6.08 
[percent]) and the USA (6.18 [percent]).”181  The market for remittances is 
most troubling in Africa, as “[t]he Sub-Saharan Africa region remains the 
most expensive region in the world to send money to, and has registered a 
further increase from 12.29 in 3Q 2013 to 12.   in  Q 2013 . . .”182   
F.  Censorship, Human Rights, and Financial Privacy 
 
[67] Daniel Solove writes, “[w]e are in the midst of an information 
revolution, and we are only beginning to understand its implications. . . . 
[W]e have undergone a dramatic transformation in the way we shop, bank, 
and go about our daily business . . . .”183  Professor Jack Balkin observes 
that “the most important decisions affecting the future of freedom of 
speech will not occur in constitutional law; they will be decisions about 
technological design, legislative and administrative regulations, the 
formation of new business models, and the collective activities of end-
users.”184  The interconnected culture of oppressive censorship, bribery, 
corruption and extortion “is an amorphous cancer eating away at our 
societies with the very real potential to destroy commerce between nations 
and produce destructive global civil unrest.”185  Richard Alderman, 
Director of the U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) observes: 
 
I have been following . . . the events of the Arab Spring 
with the very greatest of interest.  I have also been looking 
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 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Database and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2001).  
 
184
 Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 
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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2276738. 
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at what has been happening recently in India, China, 
Russia, and other countries.  When I look, in particular, at 
the Arab Spring I see that corruption is one of the top issues 
raised by the citizens of these countries as one of their main 
grievances against the government or, indeed in some 
cases, the former government.  Some say that bribery is 
part of the culture of those countries and that we must 
respect it.  The citizens of those countries have 
demonstrated very clearly to my mind that this is not part 
of the culture that they are prepared to accept any longer.
186
 
 
[68] Internet technology has gradually become a tool of dissidence in 
repressed nations all over the world    to spread information, plan and 
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http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/director's-speeches/speeches-2011/risk-
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organize activists and conduct protests.
187
  Not surprisingly, repressive 
regimes see the Internet as a threat.”188 
  
[69] Bendrath and Mueller observe that technological advances “now 
allow [I]nternet service providers to monitor the content of data packets in 
real-time and make decisions about how to handle them.  If deployed 
widely this technology, known as deep packet inspection (DPI), has the 
potential to alter basic assumptions that have underpinned Internet 
governance to date.”189  Mina Rady presents an excellent account of how 
                                                     
187
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Trade Networks, 38 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 107, 109 (2012); Antonio A. Casilli & 
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Uprisings: A Social Simulation Experiment on the UK Riots 10 (Aug. 14, 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909467; James D. Fielder, Dissent Versus the 
(Online) Surveillance State: Measuring Authoritarian Control of the Internet 21, APSA 
2011 Annual Meeting Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1901908 (finding 
while authoritarian regimes do have some success in mitigating Internet-driven dissent, 
increasing Internet user bases ultimately reduce the ability of regimes to control online 
communication); Philip N. Howard, Sheetal D. Agarwal & Muzammil M. Hussain, When 
Do States Disconnect Their Digital Networks? Regime Responses to the Political Uses of 
Social Media 6 (Aug. 9, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907191; 
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Ponomarev, Balancing Internet Regulation and Human Rights (2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990182; Courtney C. Radsch, Digital Dissidence & Political 
Change: Cyberactivism and Citizen Journalism in Egypt 6-7, Doctoral Dissertion, 
American University, School of International Service (Dec. 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2379913.  
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Circumvention: A Survey, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 at 69 (2011), available at  
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=331:the-growth-of-global-internet-censorship-and-circumvention-a-
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Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 378 (2009). 
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cyber-based assets have proven significant to citizen activists as they 
organize against repressive regimes in Cairo, Egypt and Iran.
190
  In the 
particular case of Egypt, Rady observes: 
 
1. Social media played a critical role in calling for and 
mobilizing for collective action (either via passive 
strikes in 2008 or via active protests in 2011).  
However, the impact of proxies and social networking 
in January 2011 was [sic] critical sparks lead[ing] to the 
subsequent events.  With access to proxy channels, 
Egyptian Internet users prolonged their communication 
span, so that when Government decided to shut down 
the Internet the situation had already worsened well 
beyond [the] tipping point. 
 
2. This case is that of a repressive regime that can no 
longer enforce controls on the behavior of their citizens 
given their use of a communication technology initially 
based by a major power.
191
 
 
G.  Capital Controls 
 
[70] Bitcoin has already proven to be an asset to those living in 
countries having strict restrictions on the movement of Capital.  Financial 
                                                                                                                       
Palfrey, 2011 Circumvention Tool Evaluation at 1-3 (Berkman Center Research 
Publication No. 2011-08),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1940455.  See generally 
Hadi Asghari, Michel Van Eeten & Milton Mueller, Unraveling the Economic and 
Political Drivers of Deep Packet Inspection, GigaNet 7th Annual Symposium (2012), 
available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294434 (examining the role of economic and 
political drivers of Deep Packet Inspection technology on typical use-cases).  
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and currency crises are a constant threat in many parts of the world.
192
  
Graciela Kaminsky identifies ninety-six currency crises between January 
1970 and February 2002 (pre sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007-08) in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Indonesia, 
Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Spain, Sweden, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
193
  Other scholars have 
written about the impact of the Russian 1998 crisis on Latin American 
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 See generally Graham Bird & Ramkishen S. Rajan, Restraining International Capital 
Movements: What Does It Mean?(Centre for International Economic Studies, Working 
Paper No. 0014, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=231207 (discussing Chile 
and Malaysia's experiences with restraining capital movements); Benedict Clements & 
Herman Kamil, Are Capital Controls Effective in the 21st Century? The Recent 
Experience of Colombia (International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/09/30, 
2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp0930.pdf (assessing 
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(Pacific Basin Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. PB00-05), available at  
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Economies, (Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper No. 04-23, 
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Paper No. WP/13/266, 2013), available at 
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countries,
194
 and other examples of currency restrictions and lost 
purchasing power.
195
  Nikoloski reports that it is the currency crisis, as 
opposed to banking or sovereign debt crises, that most significantly 
exacerbates the depth and incidence of poverty in the near term.
196
   
 
[71] Argentina is but one example of the plight facing individuals 
caught up in economic crisis.
197
  Scholars point to the uneasy lack of 
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different policy choices faced by Thailand in 2006).  
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Spector; Enrique Alberola, Humberto López & Luis Servén, Tango with the Gringo: The 
Hard Peg and Real Misalignment in Argentina (World Bank Policy Research, Working 
Paper No. 3322, 2004), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=610367; Werner Baer, 
Pedro Elosegui & Andrés A. Gallo, The Achievements and Failures of Argentina's Neo-
Liberal Economic Policies (University of Illinois, Research, Working Paper No. 01-0114, 
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Currency Board: The Case of Argentina (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper 
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“confidence in Argentina’s domestic currency and the banking sector due 
to the continuous changes in regulations on interest rates and foreign 
exchange markets as well as the forced conversions of bank deposits in 
198 , 1989, and 2001 as triggers of runs against the [Argentine] peso.”198  
Kaminsky, et al. observe that, “[t]he period from the mid-1970s to 2002 
was as tumultuous as that of the earlier era and characterized by booms 
and busts in international capital flows, crises, and failed stabilization 
programs.  During this period, Argentina had eight currency crises, four 
banking crises, and two sovereign defaults.”199  Daniel Kostzer notes that 
at the end of 2001, the Argentine government limited daily “money 
withdrawals from the banking system to a maximum of 300 pesos (equal 
to US$300 [sic]).”200  Hector Maletta reports: 
 
At the end of 2001 . . . the Argentine President resigned, 
the interim Government declared it would not continue 
serving its debts, and a widespread economic crisis ensued.  
The currency collapsed, banks were ordered to freeze 
deposits, and the nation’s output fell . . . .  The crisis also 
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caused a rise in joblessness to 26% in the wake of the 
enormous contraction of consumption, investment and 
output.  After a decade of price stability, inflation returned 
with a rise of 40.9% along 2002, especially during the first 
half of the year, and a further 23.5% distributed along 
2003-2005, . . . .  Time deposits were kept frozen for a long 
time, and those denominated in dollars were forcibly 
converted to pesos at a loss (in dollars) of about one half of 
their previous worth.
201
  
 
These tragic developments meant those who had been assured by the 
Argentine government “that a peso was as good as a dollar, suddenly 
realized this was not the case.  Not only a peso was not a dollar but . . . 
people did not want to hold the Argentine Currency.  Yet because deposits 
were frozen, they were unable to dispose of unwanted pesos.”202  Thus, in 
December 2001, “[a]ngry Argentines remembered how high inflation 
during similar freezes in 1982 . . . and 1989 had robbed them of the real 
value of their savings.”203 
H.  Innovation, Micropayments and Reducing World Poverty 
 
[72] Innovation in financial markets will, as always, provide benefits 
not now envisioned.  Among recent developments, “a cloud culture fueled 
by new media formats, mobile computing, and flash mobs has shifted the 
global disruption out of the workplace and into the streets. . . . [and] 
[d]isruptive innovations essentially redefine the value proposition for the 
                                                     
201
 Hector E. Maletta,  A Catastrophe Foretold: Economic Reform, Crisis, Recovery and 
Employment in Argentina 1 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=903124. 
 
202
 Sebastian Edwards, The Great Exchange Rate Debate After Argentina 4 (National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 9257, 2002), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=336373. 
 
203
 Steve H. Hanke & Kurt Schuler, What Went Wrong in Argentina?, CENTRAL 
BANKING, Feb. 2002, at 43, 45, available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2204682. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 4 
 
70 
 
customer.”204  During recent years, rapid technological change has 
produced a significant increase in the use of mobile payments.
205
  As 
William Luther observes, “the widespread adoption of smartphones [sic] 
has made it easier to make and receive payments in person with electronic 
bank accounts and digital wallets.  More recently, the development of 
inexpensive card-reading devices has enabled virtually anyone to accept 
electronic payments.”206 Jon Garon writes: 
 
Particularly in the area of payment systems, the 
implications of network effects will have a highly 
disintermediating impact.  One particular payment system 
will become more readily used than the others, and as more 
objects can be purchased using that system, it will become 
more valuable and disrupt other systems. . . .   
 
Two competing networks drive network effects: the 
network of consumers and the network of merchants.  The 
cost, convenience, social relevance, and network for the 
merchant may have quite a different value proposition than 
for the consumer.  Merchants struggling to reduce the fees 
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they pay to current credit card companies are motivated to 
find less expensive alternatives, so some are promoting 
competition. . . .  In short, the battle over payment systems 
will decide the future of the Fortune 100.
207
  
 
It is clear that the challenges of reducing world poverty is intimately tied 
to issues involving reducing the transaction costs of remittances and the 
threat of capital/currency controls discussed above.
208
  In turn, issues of 
global poverty are directly related to the propensity for outbreaks of civil 
war and terrorism.
209
   Bracking and Sachikonye find:  
 
[R]emittances are critical to household wellbeing in 
Zimbabwe. . . .  Indeed, it has become a commonplace in 
the research area of migration and development, and its 
subfield of poverty reduction and remittance studies, that 
international migration can have a positive impact on 
poverty reduction through the generation of migrant 
remittances[,] and, for the vast majority of researchers, that 
remittances are positively associated with economic 
growth.  Within international development, much hope has 
been invested that remittances provide an accessible 
pathway out of poverty, and an alternative to inter-
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governmental and official systems of development 
assistance.
210
   
 
I.  Bitcoin in China 
 
[73] During November 2013, China Daily reported that “China now 
transacts half of the global Bitcoin volume and is a leader in pushing up 
the exchange rate.”211  About a week later, China Daily observed that 
“[a]n estimated 1.8 million Bitcoins were traded on BTC China in 
November [2013], the platform with the highest trading volume in the 
world, according to statistics gathered by bitcoincharts.com, which 
provides financial and technical data related to the Bitcoin network.”212  
This compares with second-ranked Mt. Gox, which accounted for nearly 
700,000 Bitcoins traded during November, 2013.
213
  On December 5, 
2013, in a joint statement issued with four of China’s major regulatory 
organizations (the China Banking Regulatory Commission, China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology, and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission), the 
People’s Bank of China, China’s central bank, “barred financial 
institutions from handling Bitcoin transactions after investors lost money 
                                                     
210
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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265516 (internal citations omitted). 
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on fraudulent online platforms for the virtual currency.”214  Reasoning 
offered by the central bank was that “the virtual currency could be used 
for reckless speculation, money laundering, drug and gun transactions, 
gambling and other illegal activities.  It could also be used by terrorists to 
fund attacks.”215  China Daily reported that “[w]ithin one hour following 
the warning, per Bitcoin price plunged by as much as 35 percent at BTC 
China, the main Bitcoin trading platform in the country.”216  Moreover, the 
regulatory agencies 
 
[D]emanded financial and payment institutions not to price 
their products or services with Bitcoins, or to engage in 
transactions involving Bitcoins, or to accept insurances 
related to Bitcoins.  The notice also told Bitcoin-transaction 
online platforms to register at China’s telecom industry 
regulator in accordance with laws, and to carry out anti-
laundering obligations by identifying its consumers and 
reporting suspicious transactions . . .  After the release of 
the notice, the price of one Bitcoin at BTC China dived 
from 6,970 yuan ($1,137) to as low as just over 4,500 yuan 
in about one hour, down by 35 percent.
217
 
 
[74] Shortly thereafter, China’s central bank ordered third-party 
payment companies “not to do business with Bitcoin exchanges in China, 
meaning that holders of the virtual currency would lack a channel to 
exchange their Bitcoins for such currencies as the Chinese yuan or US 
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dollar.”218  “Alipay, the payment unit of Alibaba . . . confirmed to China 
Daily . . . that it has not supported and will not support Bitcoin-based 
transactions.”219  On January 8, 201 , Taobao, China’s “largest customer-
to-customer site, banned the transaction of virtual currency exchanges . . .  
following a central bank notice.”220 
 
J.  Theoretical Foundation, Open-Source Communities & 
Bitcoin 
 
[75] The European Central Bank reports that the theoretical foundation 
of Bitcoin “can be found in the Austrian school of economics and its 
criticism of the current fiat money system and interventions undertaken by 
governments and other agencies, which, in their view, result in 
exacerbated business cycles and massive inflation.”221  According to the 
European Central Bank 
 
One of the topics upon which the Austrian School of 
economics, led by Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Ludwig von 
Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek, has focused is business 
cycles.  In short, according to the Austrian theory, business 
cycles are the inevitable consequence of monetary 
interventions in the market, whereby an excessive 
expansion of bank credit causes an increase in the supply of 
money through the money creation process in a fractional-
reserve banking system, which in turn leads to artificially 
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low interest rates.  In this situation, the entrepreneurs, 
guided by distorted interest rate signals, embark on overly 
ambitious investment projects that do not match 
consumers’ preferences at that time relating to 
intertemporal consumption (i.e. their decisions regarding 
near-term and future consumption).  Sooner or later, this 
widespread imbalance can no longer be sustained and leads 
to a recession, during which firms need to liquidate any 
failed investment projects and readapt (restructure) their 
production structures in line with consumers’ intertemporal 
preferences.  As a result, many Austrian School economists 
call for this process to be abandoned by abolishing the 
fractional-reserve banking system and returning to money 
based on the gold standard, which cannot be easily 
manipulated by any authority. 
 
Another related area in which Austrian economists have 
been very active is monetary theory.  One of the foremost 
names in this field is Friedrich A. Hayek.  He wrote some 
very influential publications, such as Denationalisation of 
Money (1976), in which he posits that governments should 
not have a monopoly over the issuance of money.  He 
instead suggests that private banks should be allowed to 
issue non-interest-bearing certificates based on their own 
registered trademarks. These certificates (i.e. currencies) 
should be open to competition and would be traded at 
variable exchange rates.  Any currencies able to guarantee a 
stable purchasing power would eliminate other less stable 
currencies from the market.  The result of this process of 
competition and profit maximisation would be a highly 
efficient monetary system where only stable currencies 
would coexist. 
 
The following ideas are generally shared by Bitcoin and its 
supporters: 
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— They see Bitcoin as a good starting point to end 
the monopoly central banks have in the issuance of 
money. 
 
— They strongly criticize the current fractional-
reserve banking system whereby banks can extend 
their credit supply above their actual reserves and, 
simultaneously, depositors can withdraw their funds 
in their current accounts at any time. 
— The scheme is inspired by the former gold 
standard. 
 
Although the theoretical roots of the scheme can be found 
in the Austrian School of economics, Bitcoin has raised 
serious concerns among some of today’s Austrian 
economists. Their criticism covers two general aspects: a) 
Bitcoins have no intrinsic value like gold; they are mere 
bits stored in a computer; and b) the system fails to satisfy 
the “Misean Regression Theorem,” which explains that 
money becomes accepted not because of a government 
decree or social convention, but because it has its roots in a 
commodity expressing a certain purchasing power.
222
   
 
[76] While Hayek “argued that traditional government-backed 
currencies are prone to a number of weaknesses, particularly susceptibility 
to inflation and political corruption [p]rivate currencies…. are more stable 
than traditional currencies because they do not share these weaknesses.”223  
François Velde believes that Hayek is misguided in his thesis that the 
production of money should be the domain of the private sector and not 
remain a monopoly of the state.  Velde believes that Bitcoin is far from 
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what Hayek imagined, in that Bitcoin fails to be disciplined by market 
forces to maintain stability of its value.
224
  Accordingly, “[t]he Bitcoin 
network is an automaton, issuing currency at a predictable rate, perfectly 
incapable of providing ‘good money’ in Hayek’s sense, i.e., a currency of 
stable value.”225  In addition, by virtue of its first-mover advantage, 
Bitcoin has laid claim to quasi-monopoly status, “and Hayek did not 
address whether currency is a natural monopoly.”226  Accordingly, as 
Luther observes, Bitcoin use benefits from the fact that “[s]uccessive 
rounds of quantitative easing in the United States have been met with 
opposition, as some users of the dollar fear the currency will be worth 
significantly less in the future.  Similarly, instability in Europe prompts 
fears of the devaluation or outright collapse of the euro.”227 
 
[77] Bitcoin appears to have its basis as an open-source community.  
According to Teigland, Yetis and Larsson 
 
Over the past two decades, the wide adoption of the 
Internet and developments in information and 
communication technologies (ICT) have greatly boosted 
the development of online knowledge creation 
communities, with some of these collective and emergent 
environments now disrupting and transforming industries.  
For example, open source software (OSS) communities 
(e.g., LINUX, MySQL) demonstrate how a globally 
dispersed group of strangers self-organize online to 
challenge and disrupt the software industry’s established 
norms for innovation and value creation.  Money as a social 
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institution has also been affected by the developments in 
Internet and ICT and has evolved to adapt to the online 
economy.  In recent years, we have seen the rapid spread of 
online banking, new payment services such as PayPal and 
mobile payments, and even new virtual currencies such as 
Linden Dollars and Project Entropia Dollars.  These virtual 
currencies are used by virtual communities to exchange 
goods and services within the community and even with 
others outside the community, thereby providing a medium 
of exchange and a unit of account for that particular virtual 
community (ECB, 2012) . . . .
228
  Open source communities 
emerge when strangers from across the globe come 
together online to self-organize around a shared interest and 
to create value through sharing knowledge and innovating. 
Some scholars propose that these communities are 
challenging the firm-based approach to knowledge creation 
as the primary mechanism for innovation.
229
   
 
K.  Governance 
 
[78] Kroll, Davey and Felten argue that “Bitcoin will re uire the 
emergence of governance structures, contrary to the commonly held view 
in the Bitcoin community that the currency is ungovernable.”230  Teigland, 
Yetis and Larsson describe the Bitcoin community’s formal governance as 
follows: 
 
The Bitcoin Foundation was founded by seven of the 
community’s most instrumental individuals, such as Gavin 
Andresen – a core Bitcoin developer.  The Bitcoin 
Foundation has been registered under section 501c of the 
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US Internal Revenue Code in Washington, D.C., and its 
bylaws were effective as of July 23, 2012.  The Foundation 
is governed by a board with five seats split by membership 
class.  Two seats elected by the Individual member class 
(annual membership costs .23 BTC), two seats by the 
Corporate member class (five different levels from 9.4 
BTC for companies younger than two years and with less 
than 25 employees to 935.4 BTC for Platinum companies), 
and one seat by the Founding  member class. The 
Individual member class currently has 426 members (of 
which 68 are anonymous) while the Corporate member 
class comprises two platinum and eight silver members.  
The Board has established the following requirements for 
its board members: 1) an Individual member in good 
standing, 2) any business is conducted openly using their 
real identity, and 3) they pass a background check for 
felony conviction.
231
 
 
[79] As would be expected in such a diverse community as that 
associated with the technologically complex mining of Bitcoin, Kroll, 
Davey and Felten depict a number of pressing issues that require 
governance structure including: threats from actual adversaries; the need 
for a change in the minimum transaction size; protocol instabilities; and 
the resolution of inevitable software bugs and accidents such as the 
conflict between version 0.7 and 0.8 during March 2013.
232
  Moreover 
 
We argue that such governance is already emerging, that it 
will take the form of the governance of an open source 
project (in the sense that leaders cannot take actions 
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contrary to the interests and will of the community without 
naturally losing legitimacy), and that the emergence of 
formal governance structures will ultimately subject 
Bitcoin itself (and not merely particular players) to 
influence by government regulators around the world.
233
 
 
L.  Ecosystem 
 
[80] Bitcoin enjoys a growing ecosystem “including exchanges, 
transaction services providers, market information and chart providers, 
escrow providers, joint mining operations and so on.  Absent from this 
ecosystem at present are futures markets and entities offering legitimate 
investment returns, such as fractional reserve banks, although some 
individuals have announced plans to build these.”234  Reuben Grinberg 
observes 
 
Individuals holding this currency represent a number of 
interests, including technology early adopters, privacy and 
cryptography enthusiasts, government-mistrusting “gold 
bugs,” criminals, and speculators.  A large number of 
online merchants accept bitcoins, catering to individuals 
with these interests, including web hosts, online casinos, 
illicit drug marketplaces, auction sites, technology 
consulting firms, and adult media and sex toy merchants.
235
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[81] Considerable press and commercial interest grows in Bitcoin as its 
use increases.  Teigland, Yetis and Larsson report that “[o]ne area of 
interest is the range of start-ups entering the Bitcoin ecosystem.  For 
example, BitPay, an electronic payment processing system for the Bitcoin 
currency, enables merchants to accept bitcoins as a form of payment.”236  
San Francisco-based Coinbase was founded in June of 2012 as “a Bitcoin 
wallet and platform where merchants and consumers can transact.”237  
During late 2013, Coinbase received a vote of confidence and $25 million 
investment infusion, led by venture capital firm Andreessen Horowitz, 
which was subsequently doubled at the failure of Mt. Gox.
238
  
Accordingly, Coinbase lists its current metrics as “1,100,000 consumer 
wallets, 29,000 merchants, 5,000 API applications, and U.S. bank 
integration.”239  New entrants appear almost daily in the Bitcoin 
ecosystem.  As would be expected, Bitcoin seems to have inspired several 
other cryptocurrencies such as iOwe, which is “based on promises for 
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future work.”240  Coinmarketcap.com lists one hundred different 
cryptocurrencies as of mid-May 2014, having a total market capitalization 
of approximately $6.178 US billion.
241
  The top ten of these 
cryptocurrencies ranked by market capitalization as of May 13, 2014 are: 
Bitcoin ($6.604 billion), Litecoin ($294 million), Ripple ($47 million); 
Peercoin ($44.6 million); Dogecoin ($34.9 million), Nxt ($30 million); 
Namecoin ($17.7 million); Mastercoin ($16.7 million); Darkcoin ($11.2 
million); and Blackcoin ($8.4 million).
242
  For example, Litecoin describes 
itself as “a peer-to-peer Internet currency that enables instant payments to 
anyone in the world.  [Litecoin] is based on the Bitcoin protocol but 
differs from Bitcoin in that it can be efficiently mined with consumer-
grade hardware.”243   
 
[82] Peercoin boasts that “[t]hrough an innovative minting algorithm, 
the Peercoin network consumes far less energy, maintains stronger 
security, and rewards users in more sustainable ways than other 
cryptocurrencies.”244  Other Bitcoin-related or inspired projects of note 
include: the Bitcoin Investment Trust, Gyft, BitPremier, Coinsetter, itBit, 
Ripple Labs, CommitCoin, Mave and MavePay, Korbit and BitPagos;
245
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and the effort by Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss to launch a Bitcoin 
exchange-traded fund (ETF).
246
  Gambling sites are reported, such as 
Satoshi Dice, “which allow punters to gamble in a weird, automated 
fashion.”247  Jared Ho reports that during early 201  “Overstock.com 
announced that it would begin accepting bitcoins as payment for consumer 
purchases.  The company’s announcement makes Overstock.com the first 
major US online retailer to accept bitcoins, albeit via a third-party 
payment processor.”248  Bitcoin ATM machines are available in Canada, 
London,
249
 Seattle, Washington and Austin, Texas as of early 2014.
250
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M.  A Threat to International Currency Stability? 
 
[83] To examine how Bitcoin might pose a threat to international 
currency stability, let us briefly examine the role of the International 
Monetary Fund (“IMF”).  Rebuilding international economies proved to 
be a major task at the end of World War II.  As a specialized agency of the 
United Nations, the IMF is charged with tasks of (1) overseeing the 
international monetary system to ensure exchange rate stability, and (2) to 
encourage members to eliminate exchange restrictions that discourage free 
trade.
251
  Nicholas Plassaras observes that the IMF “is the international 
institution tasked with coordinating the international foreign currency 
exchange.  It sets minimum standards for what member nations can do to 
their individual currencies, in order to preserve global economic 
stability.”252  Plassaras poses the following threat scenario 
 
Because Bitcoin is not formally backed by a country’s 
government, it is not bound by the IMF’s guidelines.  As a 
result, Bitcoin poses a serious threat to the economic 
stability of the foreign currency exchange if it continues to 
grow in both value and usage.  Any other digital currency 
that entered widespread use would pose similar problems.  
Because private digital currencies like Bitcoin fall outside 
the IMF’s legal framework, the IMF is unable to obtain 
those currencies directly. As a result, the IMF is limited in 
what it can do to intervene in the event that a private digital 
currency like Bitcoin is used to attack the value of a 
conventional currency through what is known as a 
“speculative attack.”  A speculative attack occurs when an 
investor wishes to take advantage of a “weak currency,” a 
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currency that has depreciated in value relative to other 
currencies.  If left unchecked, a successful attack can push 
a weak currency’s value even lower, resulting in a 
destabilization of the international foreign currency 
exchange.  If Bitcoin becomes an important currency in 
international commerce, its use in speculative attacks could 
cause serious economic harms unless the IMF develops a 
way to counter them.
253
  
 
[84] Plassaras contends that the problem may, with time, 
become an ever greater threat to world order, in that 
 
[T]he longer the IMF takes to bring Bitcoin within its 
control, the more difficult controlling Bitcoin will become.  
Bitcoins are generated through computer software which is 
programmed to halt the production of new Bitcoins by 
approximately 2025. Once Bitcoins can no longer be 
generated, their supply becomes finite and their value can 
be expected to increase.  As their value increases, so does 
the expense that the IMF has to incur in order to obtain 
them.  Because having a supply of Bitcoins is necessary to 
effectively counter a speculative attack, the sooner the IMF 
can acquire a supply of Bitcoins, the cheaper counteracting 
such an attack will be.
254
 
 
V.  LIBERTY RESERVE 
 
[85] On May 20, 2013, a sealed indictment was returned by a grand jury 
in the Southern District of New York charging Defendants Liberty 
Reserve S.A., Arthur Budovsky, Vladimir Kats, Ahmed Yassine 
Abdelghani, Allan Esteban Hidalgo Jimenez, Azzeddine El Amine, Mark 
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Marmilev, and Maxim Chukharev with (1) conspiracy to commit money 
laundering,
255
 conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting 
business,
256
 and operation of an unlicensed money transmitting 
business.
257
  The Indictment seeks the forfeiture of property involved in 
the money laundering conspiracy or the unlicensed money transmitting 
business offenses consisting of: funds held in 45 accounts located in 
Australia, Costa Rica, China, Cypress, Hong Kong, Latvia, Morocco, 
Russia, Spain, and the United States, and Internet domain names: 
Libertyreserve.com, Exchangezone.com, Swiftexchanger.com, 
Moneycentralmarket.com, Asianagold.com, and Eurogoldcash.com.
258
 
 
A.  E-Gold (2006) 
 
[86] The founding of Liberty Reserve allegedly dates back to 
defendants Budovsky and Kats’ prior failed attempt at running Gold Age, 
Inc., a third-party digital exchange service called “e-Gold,” reportedly the 
most popular digital currency operation at the time.
259
  Assistant Attorney 
General Raman reports that establishing an account only required a valid 
e-mail address, thus providing international transactions that were highly 
anonymous.
260
  Accordingly, “e-Gold became a popular payment method 
for sellers of child pornography, operators of investment scams, and 
perpetrators of credit card and identity fraud.  At its peak, e-Gold 
reportedly moved over $6 million each day for more than 2.5 million 
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 See Indictment at ¶¶ 14, 16, United States v. Liberty Reserve, 13 Crim. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 
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accounts.  In 2008, e-Gold and the three individuals pleaded guilty.”261  
The complaint reports that “in December 2006, Budosvky and Kats were 
convicted in New York State of operating ‘Gold Age, Inc.’ as an 
unlicensed money transmitting business.  At or about the same time, E-
Gold [sic] and several of its principals were charged with various offenses 
including money laundering.”262  The complaint further alleges that 
following his criminal conviction, defendant Arthur Budovsky “set about 
building a digital currency that would succeed in eluding law enforcement 
where E-Gold had failed, by, among other ways, locating the business 
outside the United States.  Accordingly, Budovsky immigrated to Costa 
Rica, where in 2006, he and Ahmed Yassine Abdelghani, . . . the 
defendant, had incorporated Liberty Reserve.”263 
 
B.  How Liberty Reserve Works 
 
[87] The indictment reveals that  
 
[T]o use Liberty reserve’s digital currency, commonly 
referred to as ‘LR,’ a user first was re uired to open an 
account through the Liberty Reserve website.  In 
registering, the user was required to provide basic 
identifying information, such as name, address, and date of 
birth.  However, unlike traditional banks or legitimate 
online payments processors, Liberty Reserve did not 
require users to validate their identity information, such as 
by providing official identification documents or a credit 
card.  Accounts could therefore be opened easily using 
fictitious or anonymous identities. 
 
                                                     
261
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262
 Indictment supra note 258 at ¶ 11 (The Founding of Liberty Reserve). 
 
263
 Id. at ¶ 12. 
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Once a user established an account with Liberty reserve, 
the user could then conduct transactions with other Liberty 
Reserve users.  That is, the user could receive transfers of 
‘LR’ from other user’s accounts, and transfer LR from his 
own account to other users – including any ‘merchants’ that 
accepted LR as payment.  Liberty reserve charged a one-
percent fee every time a user transferred LR to another user 
through the Liberty Reserve system.  In addition, for an 
additional ‘privacy fee’ of 7  cents per transaction, a user 
could hide his own Liberty Reserve account number when 
transferring funds, effectively making the transfer 
completely untraceable, even within Liberty reserve’s 
already opaque system. 
 
To add an additional layer of anonymity, Liberty Reserve 
did not permit users to fund their accounts by transferring 
money to Liberty Reserve directly, such as by issuing a 
credit card payment or wire transfer to Liberty Reserve.  
Nor could Liberty Reserve users withdraw funds from their 
accounts directly, such as through an ATM withdrawal.  
Instead, Liberty Reserve users were required to make any 
deposits or withdrawals through the use of third-party 
‘exchangers,’ thus enabling Liberty Reserve to avoiding 
collecting any information about its users through banking 
transactions or other activity that would leave a centralized 
financial paper trail. 
 
Liberty Reserve’s ‘exchangers’ were third-party entities 
that maintained direct financial relationships with Liberty 
Reserve, buying and selling LR in bulk from Liberty 
Reserve in exchange for mainstream currency.  The 
exchangers in turn bought and sold this LR in smaller 
transactions with end users in exchange for mainstream 
currency.  Thus, in order to fund a Liberty Reserve account, 
a user was required to transmit mainstream currency in 
some fashion (through a money remitter, for example) to an 
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exchanger.  Upon receiving the user’s payment, the 
exchanger credited the user’s Liberty Reserve account with 
a corresponding amount of LR, by transferring LR from the 
exchanger’s Liberty Reserve account to the user’s account.  
Similarly, if a Liberty Reserve user wished to withdraw 
funds from his account, the user was required to transfer 
LR from his account, and the exchanger then made 
arrangements to provide the user a corresponding amount 
of mainstream currency. 
 
The Liberty Reserve website recommended a number of 
‘pre-approved’ exchangers.  These exchangers tended to be 
unlicensed money transmitting businesses operating 
without significant governmental oversight or regulation, 
concentrated in Malaysia, Russia, Nigeria, and Vietnam.  
The exchangers charged transaction fees for their services, 
typically amounting to five percent or more of the funds 
being exchanged.  Such fees were much higher than those 
charged by mainstream banks or payment processors for 
comparable money transfers.
264
 
 
C.  Criminal Activity 
 
[88] The indictment contends that 
 
Liberty Reserve’s system was designed so that criminals 
could affect financial transactions under multiple layers of 
anonymity and thereby avoid apprehension by law 
enforcement.  Not surprisingly, Liberty Reserve was in fact 
used extensively for illegal purposes, functioning in effect 
as the bank of choice for the criminal underworld.  Liberty 
Reserve users routinely established accounts under false 
names – including such blatantly criminal monikers as 
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‘Russia Hackers’ and ‘Hacker Account.’  Believing 
themselves to be protected by this anonymity, Liberty 
Reserve users then engaged in criminal transactions with an 
impunity that would have been impossible in the legitimate 
financial system. 
 
To further enable the use of Liberty reserve for criminal 
activity, its website offered a ‘shopping cart interface’ that 
‘merchant’ websites could use to accept LR currency as a 
form of payment.  The ‘merchants’ who accepted LR 
currency were overwhelmingly criminal in nature.  They 
included, for example: traffickers of stolen credit card data 
and personal identity information; peddlers of various types 
of online Ponzi and get-rich-quick schemes; computer 
hackers for hire; unregulated gambling enterprises; and 
underground drug-dealing websites. 
 
In addition to being used to process payments for illegal 
goods and services online, Liberty Reserve was also used 
by cyber-criminal associates.  Liberty Reserve was used by 
credit-card theft and computer-hacking rings operating in 
countries around the world, including Vietnam, Nigeria, 
Hong Kong, China, and the United States, to distribute 
proceeds of these conspiracies among the members 
involved.
265
 
 
[89] Jennifer Shasky Calvery, FinCEN Director, states “Liberty 
Reserve operated as an online… money transfer system . . . deliberately 
designed to avoid regulatory scrutiny and tailored its services to illicit 
actors looking to launder their ill-gotten gains . . . [a] $6 billion money 
laundering operation.”266  Acting Assistant U.S. Attorney General Raman 
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contends that the Liberty Reserve case demonstrates the DOJ’s 
determination “to pursue purported major money laundering facilitators, 
even those who hide offshore.”267  Because of the action taken by the 
DOJ, Raman states that “the site was shuttered and effectively put out of 
business, and seven defendants were charged.  One is in custody in the 
United States, one has entered a guilty plea, three others, including the 
lead defendant Budovsky, are pending extradition,” and two others are at 
large.
268
 
 
VI.  SILK ROAD 
 
[90] Between January 2011 and arrest of its entrepreneur during 
October, 2013, Silk Road operated as an intermediary, much like eBay or 
CraigsList, by providing buyers and sellers with a transaction 
infrastructure platform.  However, unlike eBay or CraigsList, Silk Road is 
dedicated to providing a high level of anonymity between buyers, sellers 
and third parties who might desire to learn the details of these transactions.  
Silk Road is just one of several anonymous networks that have recently 
become possible with the advent of relatively easy-to-use browser 
interfaces, such as the “Tor browser bundle.”269   
 
A.  How Silk Road Works 
 
[91] In their letter addressed to Attorney General Eric Holder and the 
DEA, U.S. Senators Manchin and Schumer write that  
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 Raman, supra note 8. 
 
268
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269
 Nicholas Christin, Traveling the Silk Road: A Measurement Analysis of a Large 
Anonymous Online Marketplace 2 (In Proceedings of the 22
nd
 International World Wide 
Web Conference (WWW’13), 213 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (May 2013), Working Paper 
No. CMU-CyLab-12-018), available at 
http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab12018.pdf (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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By utilizing the anonymizing network TOR, Silk Road 
ensures that users’ tracks on the site are hidden.  The only 
method of payment for these illegal purchases is an 
untraceable peer-to-peer currency known as Bitcoins.  After 
purchasing Bitcoins through an exchange, a user can create 
an account on Silk Road and start purchasing illegal drugs 
from individuals around the world and have them delivered 
to their homes within days.
270
 
 
[92] Sites dealing primarily in illicit goods and services such as Black 
Market Reloaded and The Silk Road “use Bitcoins because they can be 
exchanged and accumulated like cash without any third party recording 
[these] transactions . . . unlike PayPal or other ways of sending money 
online, [Bitcoins] are untraceable since they do not require a particular 
identity to be attached to them.”271  Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir report that 
“Silk Road also used a so-called “tumbler” which, as the site explained, 
‘sent all payments through a complex, semi-random series of dummy 
transactions making it nearly impossible to link your payment with any 
coins leaving the site.”’272 
 
[93] The indictment announced on February 4, 2014 in Manhattan 
federal court of Ross William Ulbricht, a/k/a “Dread Pirate Roberts,” a/k/a 
“Silk Road”, states that 
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 Letter from U.S. Senators Joe Manchin and Charles E. Schumer to Eric Holder, U.S. 
Attorney General and Michele Leonhart, Administrator, Drug Enforcement 
Administration (available at http://manchin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-
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 International Conference on Financial 
Cryptography and Data Security, 2 (Barbados, 2014), available at 
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/bitcoin-pirate-nakamoto.pdf. 
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ULBRICHT sought to anonymize transactions on Silk 
Road in two principal ways.  First, ULBRICHT operated 
Silk Road on what is known as “The Onion Router,” or 
“Tor” network, a special network of computers on the 
Internet, distributed around the world, designed to conceal 
the true IP addresses of the computers on the network and 
thereby the identities of the networks’ users.  Second, 
ULBRICHT designed Silk Road to include a Bitcoin-based 
payment system that served to facilitate the illegal 
commerce conducted on the site, including by concealing 
the identities and locations of the users transmitting and 
receiving funds through the site.
273
 
 
B.  Criminal Activity 
 
[94] Nicholas Christin reports that “these anonymous online markets 
very often specialize in ‘black market’ goods, such as pornography, 
weapons or narcotics.”274  U.S. Senator Joe Manchin urged during June 
2011 that the Drug Enforcement Agency and U.S. Attorney General 
“immediately shut down an anonymous online black market for drugs, 
including prescription drugs, cocaine, LSD and heroin.”275  Making 
specific reference to Silk Road, the Senator’s press release observes that 
“[t]he illicit network . . . allows users anywhere in the country to purchase 
illicit drugs using untraceable currency and have them shipped to their 
                                                     
273
 Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of  New York, 
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces The Indictment of Ross Ulbricht, The Creator and 
Owner of The “Silk Road” Website (Feb. 4, 2014) (available at 
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 Christin, supra note 269, at 2. 
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 Press Release, U.S. Senator Joe Manchin, Manchin Urges Federal Law Enforcement 
to Shut Down Online Black Market for Illegal Drugs (June 6, 2011) (available at 
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homes via the United States Postal Service.”276  The October 25, 2013 
complaint and civil forfeiture action filed in Manhattan federal court 
allege that Ross William Ulbricht had owned and operated, since about 
January 2011, an “underground website known as Silk Road, which 
emerged as the most sophisticated and extensive criminal marketplace on 
the internet.”277  This complaint further alleges that Silk Road “served as a 
sprawling black-market bazaar where unlawful goods and services, 
including illegal drugs of virtually every variety, were bought and sold 
regularly by the site’s users . . . [and] was used by several thousand drug 
dealers and other unlawful vendors to distribute hundreds of kilograms of 
illegal drugs” during its approximately 2 ½-year operating life.278  The 
Manhattan U.S. Attorney described Silk Road as “a hidden website 
designed to enable its users to buy and sell illegal drugs and other 
unlawful goods and services anonymously and beyond the reach of law 
enforcement.”279  Moreover, 
 
In addition to the civil action, a criminal complaint against 
ULBRICHT was filed in Manhattan federal court charging 
him with one count of narcotics conspiracy, one count of 
conspiracy to commit computer hacking, and one count of 
money laundering conspiracy.  ULBRICHT was arrested in 
San Francisco, California, on October 1, 2013 . . . .  
                                                     
276
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ULBRICHT has also been charged in a separate indictment 
pending in federal court in Baltimore, Maryland.
280
 
 
[95] According to the February 4, 2014 indictment and other 
information and documents previously filed in Manhattan federal court: 
 
ULBRICHT deliberately operated Silk Road as an online 
criminal marketplace intended to enable its users to buy 
and sell drugs and other illegal goods and services 
anonymously and outside the reach of law enforcement . . .  
 
The vast majority of items for sale on Silk Road were 
illegal drugs, which were openly advertised as such on the 
site.  As of September 23, 2013, Silk Road had nearly 
13,000 listings for controlled substances, listed under such 
categories as “Cannabis,” “Dissociatives,” “Ecstasy,” 
“Intoxicants,” “Opioids,” “Precursors,” “Prescription,” 
“Psychedelics,” and “Stimulants.”  From November 2011 
to September 2013, law enforcement agents made more 
than 100 individual undercover purchases of controlled 
substances from Silk Road vendors.  These purchases 
included heroin, cocaine, ecstasy, and LSD, among other 
illegal drugs, and were filled by vendors believed to be 
located in more than ten different countries, including the 
United States, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Austria and France. 
 
In addition to illegal narcotics, other illicit goods and 
services were openly bought and sold on Silk Road as well.  
For example, as of September 23, 2013, there were: 159 
listings under the category “Services,” most of which 
offered computer-hacking services, such as a listing by a 
vendor offering to hack into social networking accounts of 
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the customer’s choosing; 801 listings under the category 
“Digital goods,” including malicious software, hacked 
accounts at various online services, and pirated media 
content; and 169 listings under the category “Forgeries,” 
including offers to produce fake driver’s licenses, 
passports, Social Security cards, utility bills, credit card 
statements, car insurance records, and other forms of false 
identification documents.   
 
Using the online moniker “Dread Pirate Roberts,” or 
“DPR,” ULBRICHT controlled and oversaw every aspect 
of Silk Road, and managed a small staff of paid, online 
administrators who assisted with the day-to-day operation 
of the site. Through his ownership and operation of Silk 
Road, ULBRICHT reaped commissions worth tens of 
millions of dollars generated from the illicit sales 
conducted through the site.  ULBRICHT also demonstrated 
a willingness to use violence to protect his criminal 
enterprise and the anonymity of its users. ULBRICHT even 
solicited six murders-for-hire in connection with operating 
the site, although there is no evidence these murders were 
actually carried out.
281
 
C.  Use of Bitcoin 
 
[96] The FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of 
New York announced on October 2 , 2013 that “[a]long with a prior 
seizure of approximately 29,655 Bitcoins, federal law enforcement agents 
have now seized a total of approximately 173,991 Bitcoins in connection 
with the Silk Road case . . . worth over $33.6 million.”282  Just a few 
weeks later, as of November 15, 2013, the value of these 173,991 Bitcoins 
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doubled to more than $70 million.
283
  This seizure arises as a result of “a 
civil action previously filed . . . on September 30, 2013, seeking the 
forfeiture of all assets of Silk Road, including its website and all of its 
Bitcoins because those assets allegedly were used to facilitate money 
laundering and constitute property involved in money laundering.”284  
 
[97] On January 16, 2014, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of 
New York announced the forfeiture of approximately 29,655 Bitcoins 
(worth approximately $28 million) and the forfeiture of the Silk Road 
hidden website.
285
  Just ten days later, the unsealing of charges were 
announced “against ROBERT M. FAIELLA, a/k/a/ ‘BTCKing,’ an 
underground Bitcoin exchanger, and CHARLIE SHREM, the Chief 
Executive Officer and Compliance Officer of a Bitcoin exchange 
company, for engaging in a scheme to sell over $1 million in Bitcoins to 
users of ‘Silk Road.’”286  Allegations in the Criminal Complaint revealed: 
 
From about December 2011 to October 2013, FAIELLA 
ran an underground Bitcoin exchange on the Silk Road 
website, a website that served as a sprawling and 
anonymous black market bazaar where illegal drugs of 
virtually every variety were bought and sold regularly by 
the site’s users. Operating under the username “BTCKing,” 
FAIELLA sold Bitcoins    the only form of payment 
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http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/January14/SilkRoadForfeiture.php. 
 
286
 Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, 
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Charges Against Bitcoin Exchangers, Including 
CEO Of Bitcoin Exchange Company, For Scheme To Sell And Launder Over $1 Million 
In Bitcoins Related To Silk Road Drug Trafficking (Jan. 27, 2014),  
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/January14/SchremFaiellaChargesPR.php. 
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accepted on Silk Road    to users seeking to buy illegal 
drugs on the site.  Upon receiving orders for Bitcoins from 
Silk Road users, he filled the orders through a company 
based in New York, New York (the “Company”).  The 
Company was designed to enable customers to exchange 
cash for Bitcoins anonymously, that is, without providing 
any personal identifying information, and it charged a fee 
for its service.  FAIELLA obtained Bitcoins with the 
Company’s assistance, and then sold the Bitcoins to Silk 
Road users at a markup. 
 
SHREM is the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, 
and from about August 2011 until about July 2013, when 
the Company ceased operating, he was also its Compliance 
Officer, in charge of ensuring the Company’s compliance 
with federal and other anti-money laundering (“AML”) 
laws.  SHREM is also the Vice Chairman of a foundation 
dedicated to promoting the Bitcoin virtual currency system. 
 
SHREM, who personally bought drugs on Silk Road, was 
fully aware that Silk Road was a drug-trafficking website, 
and through his communications with FAIELLA, SHREM 
also knew that FAIELLA was operating a Bitcoin exchange 
service for Silk Road users.  Nevertheless, SHREM 
knowingly facilitated FAIELLA’s business with the 
Company in order to maintain FAIELLA’s business as a 
lucrative source of Company revenue.  SHREM knowingly 
allowed FAIELLA to use the Company’s services to buy 
Bitcoins for his Silk Road customers; personally processed 
FAIELLA’s orders; gave FAIELLA discounts on his high-
volume transactions; failed to file a single suspicious 
activity report with the United States Treasury Department 
about FAIELLA’s illicit activity, as he was otherwise 
re uired to do in his role as the Company’s Compliance 
Officer; and deliberately helped FAIELLA circumvent the 
Company’s AML restrictions, even though it was 
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SHREM’s job to enforce them and even though the 
Company had registered with the Treasury Department as a 
money services business.   
 
Working together, SHREM and FAIELLA exchanged over 
$1 million in cash for Bitcoins for the benefit of Silk Road 
users, so that the users could, in turn, make illegal 
purchases on Silk Road. 
 
In late 2012, when the Company stopped accepting cash 
payments, FAIELLA ceased doing business with the 
Company and temporarily shut down his illegal Bitcoin 
exchange service on Silk Road. FAIELLA resumed 
operating on Silk Road in April 2013 without the 
Company’s assistance, and continued to exchange tens of 
thousands of dollars a week in Bitcoins until the Silk Road 
website was shut down by law enforcement in October 
2013.
287
 
 
[98] From analysis performed on available Bitcoin data compared with 
FBI disclosures, Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir contend that the FBI has yet to 
recover all the Bitcoins earned by the Dread Pirate Roberts (Ross William 
Ulbricht):   
 
[T]here is a huge variability in the amount he earned which 
we are aware of, which is inconsistent with the reasonable 
assumption that the total volume of business carried out on 
Silk Road was increasing at a roughly constant rate.  In 
particular, the months of May, June and September 2013 
are completely missing from this list.  Assuming that DPR 
continued to receive at least some commissions from Silk 
Road during these months, it seems likely that he was 
simply using a different computer during these periods, 
                                                     
287
 Id. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XX, Issue 4 
 
100 
 
which the FBI had not found or was unable to penetrate.  In 
addition, it is evident that about a third of the bitcoins in 
these accounts, were moved out prior to his arrest.  As it is 
believed that the Silk Road marketplace generated sales 
revenue of more than 9.5 million bitcoins with an average 
commission rate of 6.67%, we can conclude that he 
received about 633,000 BTCs in commissions.  
Consequently, the amounts seized by the FBI represent 
only about 22% of these commissions, while the amounts 
that we have identified . . . seem to represent about a 
third.
288
  
VII.  DEMISE OF MT. GOX 
 
[99] Mt. Gox, once the dominant online marketplace for the purchase 
and sale of Bitcoin, apparently failed on February 25, 2014, leaving many 
investors who held Bitcoin stranded.
289 
 The Mt. Gox website was replaced 
with a letter addressed to its customers from Mark Karpeles which read: “I 
would like to use this opportunity to reassure everyone that I am still in 
Japan, and working very hard with the support of different parties to find a 
solution to our recent issues.”290  A companion note under the signature of 
the “MtGox Team” states, “In light of recent news reports and the 
potential repercussions on MtGox’s operations and the market, a decision 
was taken to close all transactions for the time being in order to protect the 
site and our users.  We will be closely monitoring the situation and will 
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react accordingly.”291  During 2009, Mt. Gox began operations “as an 
exchange for trading cards tied to a popular online game called Magic: 
The Gathering.  It soon shifted its focus to Bitcoin . . . .”292  Although 
perhaps too early to know the complete reasons for Mt. Gox’s failure, 
press accounts mention “accusations that as much as 6 percent of the 
Bitcoins in circulation were now missing    worth more than $300 million 
at current exchange rates.”293  Another news source states that “Mt. Gox 
lost almost 7 0,000 bitcoins in a long    running theft . . . valued at about 
$ 00 million at current prices.”294  In an astonishing price recovery, 
Tuesday evening [Feb. 24, 2014] the price of a Bitcoin stood around $525, 
not far from where it was when the Mt. Gox news emerged Monday 
night.
295
  Less than a year earlier, Tokyo-based Mt. Gox was reported to 
handle 80% of all trading activity in Bitcoin and is reported to have said 
that “as the bitcoin market continues to evolve and expand, [Mt. Gox] 
must adjust to new regulatory and compliance demands.”296   
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VIII.  BITCOIN AFTER LIBERTY RESERVE AND SILK ROAD 
 
[100] Concerns that have been voiced during recent years have reached 
new prominence since the Liberty Reserve indictment.  Reuben Grinberg 
observes that “although the Bitcoin economy is flourishing, users are 
anxious about Bitcoin’s legal status and the possibility of a government 
crackdown.  Some point to Bitcoin’s ability, like all digital and 
anonymous currencies, to facilitate money laundering, tax evasion, and 
trade in illegal drugs and child pornography.”297  Catherine Martin 
Christopher contends that “law enforcement should look to digital 
currency exchangers not as criminals, but instead as partners in the effort 
to eradicate money laundering and    more importantly    the crimes 
underlying the laundering.”298 
 
[101] In discussing the “perplexities” of virtual currencies, FinCEN 
Director, Jennifer Shasky Calvery, notes the importance, “potential,” and 
                                                     
297
 Grinberg, supra note 234, (citing epii, Comment on How long until governments 
outlaw bitcoin usage?, BITCOIN FORUM (Mar. 29, 2011 8:40:41 AM), 
http://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic= 110.msg7 627#msg7 627 (“I think that 
illegalization is Bitcoin’s most likely mode of failure.”)); see, e.g., id. n. 7 (“Considering 
how quickly services like Silk Road [an anonymous marketplace for illegal drugs] have 
sprung up, and the fact that the demographic of people who seem most interested in 
Bitcoin at this point tends to overlap with the demographic of likely tax evaders, I am 
afraid that this illegalization might just be a matter of time.”); see also, Derek A. Dion, 
Note, I’ll Gladly Trade You T o Bits on Tuesday for a Byte Today: Bitcoin, Regulating 
Fraud in the E-conomy of Hacker-Cash, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 165, 167 
(2013) (discussing the legal principles that can be potentially leveraged to regulate 
Bitcoin). 
 
298
 Catherine Martin Christopher, Whack-a-Mole: Why Prosecuting Digital Currency 
Exchanges Won't Stop Online Laundering, LEWIS & CLARK L. REV., 1 (forthcoming 
2013), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2312787; see generally Paul H. Farmer, 
Note, Speculative Tech: The Bitcoin Legal Quagmire & the Need for Legal Innovation, 9 
J. BUS. & TECH. L. 85 (2014), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol9/iss1/6. 
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great “promise” of advances offered to our economy by virtual 
currencies.
299
  Director Calvery states  
 
The innovations we are seeing within the financial services 
industry are a benefit to commerce on many levels.  From 
providing services to the unbanked, to the development of 
new financial products, the virtual economy holds great 
promise . . . [the] challenge to our great innovators [will be 
to] extend your focus to devising creative solutions for 
preventing the abuse of virtual currencies by criminals, 
such as those who would exploit children.
300
 
 
[102] Our discussion of the future of virtual currencies should consider 
the views of François Velde who states 
 
I’m not  uite sure why there is so much attention paid to 
the use of Bitcoin to settle legal transactions    cash has 
been used for those purposes forever.  If anything, a virtual 
currency like Bitcoin provides traceability    if you have 
access to a criminal’s hard drive, and therefore to his wallet 
information, you could prove in court that certain payments 
were made.
301
 
 
A.  Future Regulatory Dialogue: Legal Interoperability 
 
[103] The debate regarding open access and internet governance has 
been ongoing for many years.
302
  Jonathan Zittrain observes that 
                                                     
299
 Calvery, supra note 94, at 4. 
 
300
 Id. 
 
301
 E-mail from François R. Velde, Senior Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 
to author (Feb. 11, 2014, 14:23 CST) (on file with author). 
 
302
 See generally Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: 
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV.  925, 
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Cyberlaw’s challenge ought to be to find ways of regulating    
though not necessarily through direct state action     which code can 
and cannot be readily disseminated and run upon the generative 
grid of Internet and PCs, lest consumer sentiment and preexisting 
regulatory pressures prematurely and tragically terminate the grand 
experiment that is the Internet today.
303
   
 
[104] Urs Gasser and John G. Palfrey have broadly defined the term 
legal interoperability as “the working-together among legal norms, either 
within a given legal system of a nation state (e.g. federal and state 
legislation) or across jurisdictions or nations.”304  Their core belief is 
found in the argument “that policy-makers in the digital age should not 
only aim for higher levels of technical and related layers of 
interoperability, but should by default also seek to increase legal and, 
eventually, policy interoperability, particularly as we move towards multi-
level governance systems.”305  Thus, I will extend their argument to 
                                                                                                                       
929-930 (2001); Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet 
Architecture and the Law (U. San Diego Pub. Law Research, Working Paper No. 55, 
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=416263; Laura DeNardis, The Emerging 
Field of Internet Governance, Yale Information Society Project Working Paper Series 
(2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1678343. 
 
303
 Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1979 (2006). 
 
304
 Urs Gasser & John G. Palfrey, Jr., Fostering Innovation and Trade in the Global 
Information Society: The Different Facets and Roles of Interoperability, Berkman Ctr. 
Res. Pub. No. 2012-20, 8 (Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2192647.  
 
305
 Id. at 9 (citing L. Hooghe & G. Marks, Unraveling the Central State, But How? Types 
of Multi-Level Governance, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 233, 236-239 (2003) (Gasser & 
Palfrey propose ‘to include interoperability as an additional design principle for both 
Type I and Type II multi-governance systems as a means to address the respective 
coordination problems’)); see also Urs Gasser & John G. Palfrey, Jr. & Matthew B. 
Becker, Mapping Cloud Interoperability in the Globalized Economy: Theory and 
Observation from Practice, Berkman Ctr. Res. Pub. No. 2012-19, (June 1, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2192641. 
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contend that by optimizing the international governance of virtual 
currency, this legal interoperability should “enable the flow of goods, 
services, and information across legal systems.”306  Gasser and Palfrey 
offer at least three reasons why focusing on attaining legal interoperability 
should prove beneficial 
 
1. Legal interoperability is a mechanism that reduces the 
costs associated with cross-jurisdictional business 
transactions; 
 
2. Anecdotal evidence suggests that legal interoperability, 
at least in the ICT [information and communication 
technology] space with its unique characteristics, drives 
innovation, competition, trade, and economic growth; 
 
3. “[I]ncreased levels of best-practice-oriented legal 
interoperability may also foster fundamental values and 
rights, such as information privacy and freedom of 
expression."
307
 
 
[105] Gasser and Palfrey are quick to point out that their concept of legal 
interoperability does not necessarily re uire “new international law or the 
establishment of international organizations.  Which approach should be 
pursued in the context of a given governance issue    like . . . cloud 
computing . . . depends on an in-depth analysis of the various 
                                                     
306
 Gasser & Palfrey, supra note 304 (citing H. Burkert, ‘The Information Law Approach: 
An Exemplification,’ in U. Gasser (ed.), Information Quality Regulation: Foundations, 
Perspectives and Applications (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), 75-90)) (On the 
information law approach more generally; observing, ‘A particularly interesting subset of 
legal interoperability issues is interoperability among legal norms aimed at regulating 
information.  Such an information law approach to interoperability, which would have to 
differentiate among the different types and contexts of information still needs to be 
developed . . .)).  
 
307
 Gasser & Palfrey, supra note 304, at 9. 
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technological, market, and legal factors . . . .”308  Grinberg predicts that 
U.S. federal and state regulations will need to clarify how Bitcoin fits 
regarding: “registration with state or federal regulators; know your 
customer (KYC), anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist 
financing; capital requirements; consumer protection standards; disclosure 
requirements; security standards; entering into derivatives on 
cryptocurrencies; taxation; and risk management and counterparty due 
diligence standards.”309  Zittrain writes 
 
Precisely because the future is uncertain, those who care 
about openness and the innovation that today’s Internet and 
PC facilitate should not sacrifice the good to the perfect    
or the future to the present    by seeking simply to maintain 
a tenuous technological status quo in the face of inexorable 
pressure to change.  Rather, we should establish the 
principles that will blunt the most unappealing features of a 
more locked-down technological future while 
acknowledging that unprecedented and, too many who 
work with information technology, genuinely unthinkable 
boundaries could likely become the rules from which we 
must negotiate exceptions.
310
 
 
 
 
                                                     
308
 Id. at 10; see also Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, The Private Digital 
Currency, And The Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 114 
(2012). 
 
309
 Reuben Grinberg, Davis Polk Discusses The Failure of Mt. Gox and Other Recent 
Bitcoin Catastrophes: Why Banks Should Care, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Columbia 
Law School’s Blog on Corporations and the Capital Market) (Mar. 13, 2014), available 
at http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/03/13/davis-polk-discusses-the-failure-of-mt-
gox-and-other-recent-bitcoin-catastrophes-why-banks-should-care/. 
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 Zittrain, supra note 303, at 1977-78. 
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B.  Implications for Further Research 
 
[106] The list of important research questions remaining to be more fully 
explored include: whether virtual currency is easier to steal than physical 
currency, how vulnerable are virtual currencies to counterfeiting, does 
Bitcoin maintain first-mover advantage or is it vulnerable to other virtual 
currencies, will depository “bank-like” financial service entities develop to 
accept deposits and make loans denominated in virtual currencies, are 
Bitcoin exchanges vulnerable to breaches from cyber attack; under what 
conditions are virtual currencies able to remain anonymous, is physical 
currency really less efficient for illegal activities than Bitcoin, and whether 
virtual currencies or Bitcoin alone becomes significant enough to threaten 
the effectiveness of central bank monetary policy and global currency 
markets?
311
  Ed Felten raises the questions of: when a miner who is 
“controlling more than 33.3% of mining power but less than 50%, is there 
still an equilibrium in which all miners are honest? . . . [and] is [there] an 
equilibrium that can actually occur in which the Bitcoin economy can no 
longer function?”312 
 
[107] Economist Robert J. Shiller states that “Bitcoin’s future is very 
much in doubt . . .  I believe that electronic forms of money could give us 
better pricing, contracting and risk management.”313  Moreover, 
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 See Allen, supra note 18.  This list draws heavily from questions raised by the U.S. 
Federal Reserve at a meeting held on June 14, 2013 at the World Bank and attended by 
officials of the European Central Bank, International Centre for Missing & Exploited 
Children (ICMEC), International Monetary Fund, U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office 
on Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, and others. 
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 Ed Felten, Game Theory and Bitcoin, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Nov. 11, 2013), 
https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/game-theory-and-bitcoin/. 
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 Robert J. Shiller, In Search of a Stable Electronic Currency, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/business/in-search-of-a-stable-electronic-
currency.html. 
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Bitcoin has been a bubble.  But the legacy of the Bitcoin 
experience should be that we move toward a system of 
stable economic units of measurement    a system 
empowered by sophisticated mechanisms of electronic 
payment.
314
   
 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
 
[108] Virtual currencies have quickly become a reality, gaining 
significant traction in a very short period of time, and are evolving rapidly.  
Innovation in the pace of development of new currencies and technologies 
continues to create ongoing challenges for responsible users of technology 
and regulators alike.  Virtual currencies, due primarily to its anonymous 
characteristic, have been linked to numerous types of crimes, including 
facilitating marketplaces for: assassins; attacks on businesses; child 
exploitation (including pornography); corporate espionage; counterfeit 
currencies; drugs; fake IDs and passports; high yield investment schemes; 
sexual exploitation; stolen credit cards and credit card numbers; and 
weapons.  While technological advances create great opportunities to 
improve the health, living conditions, and general wellbeing of mankind; 
new technologies also create great challenges for nation states. 
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